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Abstract 
Ready-to-Use food (RUF) product are nutrient dense foods given to individuals that are suffering 
from acute malnutrition. Currently 5.8 million children suffer from malnutrition in Ethiopia and 
the timely and efficient delivery of ready-to-use food products has a significant impact on the 
lives of these children. However, challenges exist in both the local and international production 
and delivery of RUF products. One of the challenges is the high transaction costs that exist in the 
supply chains. Transaction costs are the costs associated with searching for information 
regarding a product or its market, negotiating a deal and enforcing the terms of the deal. In 
situations where transaction costs are high due to missing or weak markets and institution, 
people have relied on different mechanisms including social capital (trust and information 
sharing) to deal with these costs and carry out business and transactions. The purpose of the 
study is to examine the role institutions, in particular informal institutions, play in addressing 
these challenges and improving the supply chain for Ready-to-use food products and chickpea 
marketing (which is a potential ingredient in new RUF formulations). The institutions examined 
in this study are mainly the non-market institutions like trust and information sharing that build 
social capital. Data was collected through surveys and interviews from RUF supply chain actors 
in Ethiopia. These include chickpea producers, RUTF producers, major demanders 
(humanitarian organizations and governments), transporters, beneficiaries (feeding centers and 
hospitals). These agents’ use of informal institutions and trust level during transactions with each 
other is assessed.  Interviews with key informants in the value chain in Ethiopia were conducted 
to further inform the analysis of institutions in supply chain organization and identify areas of 
high transaction cost. The transaction costs that are present in the supply chains were further 
identified through focus group discussions with farmers and a farmer survey. Both qualitative 
and quantitative methods were used to analyze these data. The structure equation model (SEM) 
was used to quantitatively analyze the data obtained from farmer survey. The study also found 
that trust between trading partners reduces the time farmers spent negotiating price with buyers. 
Trust between trading partners also increased the marketed surplus of farmers. Information 
sharing among trade partners positively affects trust between partners. The study finds that 
institutions facilitate chickpea marketing through improving trust and information sharing among 
trading partners. The results indicate that membership in informal institutions strengthens the 
trust and information sharing between trading partners and this in turn reduces the transaction 
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costs associated with chickpea trade. In addition, the current performance of the RUF supply 
chain in Ethiopia is found to be relatively efficient with some issues in the availability of local 
and imported inputs and the failure to comply with quality standards. These results imply that 
existing, informal institutions in developing countries can be as effective as formal institutions so 
effort should be put towards their development and improvement. The RUF supply chain can 
also be further improved by increasing the capacity of local manufacturers to increase production 
and their capacity to adhere to quality standards. Stabilizing input markets to make inputs to 
RUF production more consistently available will also improve the production capacity and 
improve the price and accessibility of RUF products.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Undernutrition is the underlying cause of 53% of infant and child deaths and 44% of children 
suffer from chronic undernutrition in Ethiopia (USAID, 2017). Ready to use foods (RUF) are 
high energy foods given to individuals, usually children who are malnourished. RUF can be in 
the form of either ready to use therapeutic food (RUTF) or ready to use supplementary food 
(RUSF). RUTF is given to individuals with severe acute malnutrition1 while RUSF is given to 
individuals with moderate malnutrition. These food products are usually a paste made of peanuts, 
milk powder, oil, sugar, and are fortified with vitamins and minerals.  
 
Several challenges exist in the production and delivery of RUF products from offshore and local 
sources. The major challenges in the global supply of RUFs include variability in lead time (time 
between order and delivery), lack of information sharing among supply chain agents, high cost of 
logistics, lengthy delivery times and delays in delivery (UNICEF, 2009). This has led to 
increased interest in local procurement. The benefits of local procurement include increased 
attention by regional governments, less time in custom clearance processes, and growth in local 
agriculture and food production. However, local production has challenges. Challenges in local 
production and supply chains for RUTF in Ethiopia include the high cost of local production due 
to high import taxes on imported ingredients and lack of grading facilities to assure quality. High 
transaction costs, lack of foreign exchange to import ingredients, and financial limitations to 
increase production as the facilities are not producing to their maximum capacity are further 
challenges in the RUF supply chain. The lack of sufficient information flow between donors, 
UNICEF, Ministry of Health and lack of correct forecast/ assessment of need and demand for 
RUF have been identified as issues that affect the performance of the supply chain both locally 
and globally (Komrska, Kopczak, & Swaminathan, 2013; Swaminathan, 2009). 
 
Institutions have been shown to play a major role in supply chain organization and management, 
especially in developing countries (Alemu, Maertens, Deckers, Bauer, & Mathijs, 2016). 
Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
                                                          
1 Severe Acute malnutrition is defined by a very low weight for height (below-3z scores of the median WHO growth 
standards), by visible severe wasting, or by the presence of nutritional oedema (WHO, 2017). 
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constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3).  Institutions (formal and informal) 
are the rules and procedures that shape social interaction. One of the main roles institutions play 
is lowering transaction costs. The existence of properly functioning institutions like law 
enforcement agencies, courts, quality grading agencies, and market information services can 
lower transaction costs. Transaction costs are often categorized as search costs (cost of searching 
for information regarding a product and its market), negotiation costs (cost of negotiating the 
transaction including price of the product), monitoring and enforcement costs (costs of ensuring 
terms of the transaction are met and agents do not deviate from agreed behavior). The 
Transaction Cost Economics approach is one of the different theories that explain economic 
agent’s behavior. It postulates that economic agents choose different marketing channels to 
lower transaction costs.  
 
Contractual agreement is one marketing channel that reduces opportunism and information 
asymmetry. Contract agreements that can be enforced improve trust and reduce opportunistic 
behavior that lead to transaction costs (Zhang & Hu, 2011). However, in the absence of formal 
contracts or institutions that can enforce them, mutual interest and informal institutions can 
effectively reduce opportunistic behavior. This paper uses the transaction cost approach to study 
the role of informal institutions and social capital (trust and information sharing) in the supply 
chain organization of ready to use foods in Ethiopia. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Agricultural markets in developing countries are characterized by high transaction costs, poor 
infrastructure and imperfect information (Gebremedhin, Jaleta, & Hoekstra, 2009; van Dijk & 
Trienekens, 2011).Supply chains in Ethiopia are characterized by high transaction costs due to 
weak institutions that make contract enforcement difficult, do not provide information on price 
or quality and due to poor infrastructure (USAID, 2015) and there is limited participation of the 
private sector ( Gebremedhin et al., 2009). Contracts are not commonly used in transactions and 
traders mostly use the spot market and occasionally cooperatives to get agricultural supplies 
(Abebaw & Haile, 2013).  
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Institutions play a role in reducing transaction costs and thus in the development and 
effectiveness of supply chains in Ethiopia (Gebremedhin et al., 2009). Though there have been 
improvements in the increased involvement of economic institutions in the agricultural sector in 
Ethiopia over the last few years, there is still great potential in terms of improving efficiency and 
access of smallholder farmers to institutions. Most smallholder farmers still lack access to 
markets, modern inputs and financial services. To address these challenges the government has 
implemented different policies and strategies and has increased expenditure on the agriculture 
sector.  Since 1991, Ethiopia has been following a policy of Agricultural Development-Led 
Industrialization (ADLI) that recognizes agriculture as the engine of growth. The main purpose 
of this strategy has been to improve market access, rural infrastructure, and access to financial 
services and promote proper use of land. In line with this strategy, both the Plan for Accelerated 
and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) and the Five-Year Growth and 
Transformation Plan (FYGTP) established in 2005-2010 and 2010/11-2016 respectively had 
specific agricultural development strategies of establishing effective agricultural marketing 
systems and specialization, diversification and commercialization of agricultural production 
(Chipeta, Emana, and Chanyalew, 2015). Some of the specific programs launched and 
institutions established which aim to address smallholder farmers and agricultural markets are 
the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange and the Agricultural growth programs. These programs and 
institutions have been effective in addressing some commodity grains like coffee but they have 
still not addressed all commodities and many smallholder farmers are still outside these 
programs. Most transactions in rural Ethiopia, where 80% of the population live, still happen in 
the spot market without any formal institutions. 
  
The institutional environment can further affect the supply chain through the development of 
trust (Cai, Jun, & Yang, 2010) and by providing motivations and influencing values (Bowles, 
1998; Dong, Ju, & Fang, 2016). Buyers and sellers are less likely to engage in supply relations 
with each other when the level of trust between them is low. Trusting a partner and the 
perception of being trusted by a partner has led to increased participation of small scale farmers 
in supermarket value chains (Blandon, Henson, & Cranfield, 2009). The development of trust 
becomes particularly important when formal institutions are not there to enforce contracts or 
perform the function of formal institutions like banking/credit provision, property rights 
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protection, etc. Trust in exchange relationships also improves information sharing and 
coordination leading to better efficiency/minimizing inefficiencies (Dyer & Chu, 2003). When 
the level of institutional efficiency is different between organizations in the supply chain, i.e. 
when one organization is more coordinated or is better staffed than the other, continuous 
information sharing enhances coordination along the supply chain (Dong et al., 2016). For 
instance, UNICEF and local feeding centers/storage facilities in Ethiopia have different levels of 
institutional efficiency (with UNICEF being better coordinated and staffed) and continuous 
information sharing between the two organizations can improve the coordination in the whole 
supply chain. 
Even where formal institutions exist they are often inaccessible, corrupt and inefficient. Informal 
institutions can make up for lack of efficiency and might work better until the formal ones are 
well developed, for example, a modification of Ikkub(discussed in chapter two) can substitute for 
formal Credit Unions. Informal institutions have even been found to complement formal 
institutions like enforceable contractual agreements and improve supply chain performance(Cai 
et al., 2010; Zhang & Hu, 2011). Therefore, in countries like Ethiopia where resources to invest 
in infrastructure and economic institutions are constrained, informal institutions can be utilized 
to lower transaction costs and facilitate trade.  
This study aims to examine the effectiveness of informal institutions in building trust, 
information sharing and lowering transaction costs. It proposes that informal institutions can play 
a significant role in reducing opportunism and enhance information sharing in situations where it 
is hard to have formal institutions or where they are slow to develop, if ways are devised to 
utilize them tactfully. The main research question of the study is therefore how informal 
institutions affect the level of trust and information sharing in the RUF supply chain in Ethiopia? 
1.3 Objective of the study 
The study analyzes the supply chain structure of local RUF production starting from farmers that 
produce chickpea (which is a potential ingredient to newly developed RUF formulations) to 
retailers, wholesalers, distributors, food processors, RUF distributors and users. The objective of 
this study is to outline the supply chain structure of a locally produced RUF and to identify the 
areas of inefficiencies and where transaction costs are high and to explore how institutions 
(formal and informal) could reduce these high transaction costs.   
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The main objectives of the study are 
- To identify the main actors and their interaction in the RUF product supply chain  
- Identify the major constraints/sources of high transaction cost in the RUF supply chain  
-Identify the role institutions (formal and informal) have in the supply chain of RUF in Ethiopia 
in terms of reducing transaction costs and improving performance.   
 
1.4 Methodology 
Trust between supply chain agents is a complex phenomenon and it is not easily measured. The 
conceptual framework to measure trust is adopted from the literature which include the agent’s 
judgment of the reliability, credibility, goodwill, ability and integrity of trading partners and 
satisfaction with trading partners (Blandon et al., 2009). Buyers do not build relationships with 
sellers whom they do not trust with regards to product quality and delivery; sellers are also less 
likely to supply to buyers who they think are too risky in terms of suppliers not trusting them 
enough to demand these products continuously. Trust between exchange partners will improve 
information sharing and thus lower transaction costs (Dyer & Chu, 2003). In addition, in the 
literature trust is measured from the risk perspective (Laeequddin, Sahay, Sahay, & Abdul 
Waheed, 2010). The level of trust is measured based on the agent’s perception of the riskiness of 
the relationship/partnership.   Based on this theoretical background a conceptual model is 
developed (Figure 2.6 in chapter two) and both qualitative and quantitative analysis is used to 
examine the conceptual framework. The trust variable along with information sharing variable is 
obtained from a principal factor analysis and further refined by the confirmatory factor analysis 
in structural equation model using survey data as discussed in section 1.4.1. The relationship 
between trust, information sharing and transaction costs as outlined in the conceptual framework 
are examined using structural equation modeling. Key success factors obtained from the 
literature are also used to examine the effectiveness of the RUF supply chain.  
1.4.1 Research Design 
A survey research design was used to collect data from RUTF supply chain actors in Ethiopia. 
These include chickpea producers, RUTF producers, major demanders (humanitarian 
organizations and governments), transporters, quality and standard agencies and beneficiaries 
(feeding centers and hospitals). These agents’ use of informal institutions and trust level during 
transactions with each other is assessed. The questionnaire is developed based on the literature 
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review and conceptual framework. Semi-structured interviews were used with most of the firms 
at each stage and a focus group discussion and survey was conducted with a sample of chickpea 
farmers in Lailay Maychew woreda in Tigray, Ethiopia. Interviews with key informants in the 
value chain in Ethiopia (Guts Agro, Hilina foods and local distributors) were conducted to 
further inform the analysis of institutions in supply chain organization and identify areas of high 
transaction costs. The transaction costs that are present in the supply chains were further 
identified through focus group discussions with farmers and a farmer survey. Interviews with key 
informants in hospitals which have feeding centers that administer ready to use therapeutic foods 
and in agencies (NGOs) that distribute RUTF were also conducted to measure the key 
performance indicators for RUTF supply chains. The key performance indicators adapted from 
the literature are flexibility, responsiveness and timely delivery (Aramyan, Oude Lansink, van 
der Vorst, & van Kooten, 2007; Beamon, 1998). Trust has been found to improve key 
performance indicators, particularly responsiveness (Handfield and Bechtel, 2002). Enforceable 
contracts or trust among supply chain actors is found to improve logistic performance and 
improve confidence of agents regarding prices and quality (Cai et al., 2010). Therefore, these key 
performance indicators along with trust are used to assess the level of effectiveness of the RUTF 
supply chain.  
1.5 Outline of the structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows: the next section (chapter two) is the literature review which 
gives an overview of the country Ethiopia and moves on to discuss issues in the supply chain for 
RUFs and the role of social capital in agriculture supply chains. The literature review also 
discusses institutions and transaction costs as well as the relevant market institutions and 
government policy in Ethiopia. The market structure of chickpea as well as the performance 
measures of supply chains are discussed. Building on the literature review the conceptual 
framework is laid out and discussed. Chapter three discusses the empirical method and results. It 
starts by developing the hypotheses to be examined followed by the discussion of the survey 
design and implementation. Then the descriptive statistics are presented which includes survey 
participants’ socio-economic characteristics and their chickpea production and marketing. 
Following the descriptive statistics, the main method of analysis, the Structural Equation Model 
(SEM), and the results from the model are discussed. Then chapter four discusses the insights 
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from the interviews. Chapter five summarizes the major findings and implication of the study 
and lays out the limitations of the study.    
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Chapter 2  Literature review 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of available literature on ready-to-use 
therapeutic food products, their supply chain organization, challenges in this supply chain in 
Ethiopia, the role trust and informal institutions play in supply chains and to give an overview of 
the Ethiopian economy and some of the institutions in Ethiopia. The supply chains of the 
agriculture commodities used as an input in RUF (chickpea) as well as performance measures 
used in supply chains and possible ways to adopt them to a developing country’s agriculture 
sector and the RUTF context are discussed.  
The first section gives an overview of Ethiopia; the second section gives an overview of RUTF; 
the third section outlines the supply chain for global RUF and the fourth section discusses the 
challenges faced in producing and distributing ready-to-use food products. The fifth section 
discusses social capital and its role in agricultural supply chains. The sixth section discusses 
relevant market institutions and government policy in Ethiopia while the seventh section 
discusses the chickpea supply chain and the transaction costs in this supply chains. Performance 
measures in agriculture supply chains are discussed in the last section.  
 
2.1 Ethiopia country overview 
Ethiopia, located in the East of Africa, is the second most populous country in Africa after 
Nigeria. It has a population of 105 million with an annual population growth rate of 2.43 which 
makes it the 12th largest population in the world (United Nations, 2017). In Ethiopia, 
undernutrition is the underlying cause of 53% of infant and child death (USAID, 2017). Though 
the country has recently experienced high rates of economic growth at 7.6 % annual GDP growth 
rate, it is still one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 173 out of 187 in the UNDP 
Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme, 2014). Ethiopia’s 
economic performance is to a great degree influenced by the performance of the agriculture 
sector. Agriculture accounts for 43 percent of GDP and 90 percent of exports; it employs 80 
percent of the population and about 11.7 million smallholder households account for 95 percent 
of Agricultural GDP (USAID, 2012). Agriculture in Ethiopia is characterized by heavy reliance 
on rain, subsistence (low output), low use of inputs (like technology, fertilizer, improved seed 
etc.) and poor land management practices (Gabre-Madhin, 2001). Poverty rates differ among the 
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regions in Ethiopia and Tigray has the 4th highest poverty headcount index next to Afar, Somalia 
and Gambella.  
2.2 Overview of ready to use therapeutic foods  
Ready to use therapeutic food products are high energy food products fortified with vitamins and 
minerals which are given to severely malnourished children.  RUTF is either in the form of paste 
or a biscuit that is easy to swallow. To prevent and minimize contamination between feedings, 
the products are packed individually in aluminum foil sachets for one time consumption only 
(~100g). They are ready to consume and do not require cooking, adding water or refrigeration.  
RUTF is generally made with oil seeds, pulses, cereals, sugar, milk powder, vegetable oils, 
vitamins and minerals. Peanut-based RUTF is the most common format and it typically consists 
of milk powder (30%), sugar (28%), peanut butter or paste (25%), vegetable oil (15%) and 
vitamin and mineral premix (1.6%) (Manary, 2006). Other alternative RUTF products include a 
product with cereal as the main ingredient, legumes or beans as the source of protein, animal 
source food (egg, meat, fish or milk) and another sesame based product (Wagh & Deore, 2015). 
There are also other proposed formulations that include barley and chickpea as possible 
ingredients. 
 
The first peanut paste RUTF named Plumpy’Nut was developed by Nutriset and the French 
Institute of Research for Development in 1996 (Komrska, 2012). Currently, Nutriset is the 
largest producer of the product and it has a number of franchises around the world including 
Hilina Enriched foods in Ethiopia.The 2007 endorsement of the United Nations of RUTF use to 
treat severe acute malnutrition has increased its demand (Komrska et al., 2013). The shift from 
hospital-based treatment of severely malnourished children to home-based treatment in 
community-based programs has further increased the demand for the product (Swaminathan, 
2009). Community based programs are programs where trained community health workers or 
volunteers use a plastic strip/armband to measure the arm circumference of children and screen 
out/ identify severely malnourished children. These children are given RUTF to take home and 
periodic check-ups are done at the health facility as RUTF does not require medical supervision 
and can be given at home by any individual unless there are complications in which case they are 
treated in hospitals (WHO, WFP, & UNICEF, 2007). 
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Though RUF is distributed worldwide to 57 countries, it is mostly needed/used in Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Niger, Pakistan, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, Sudan 
and Chad (Komrska, Kopczak, & Swaminathan, 2013). Ethiopia is one of the largest demanders 
of the product with 2.7 million acutely food insecure people, 28% of children younger than 5 
dying from malnourishment every year and 303,000 children currently expected to require 
therapeutic food products (UNICEF, 2017)  
 
Ready to use therapeutic food products are supplied to those who need it by humanitarian 
agencies. United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), established in 
1946 after the second World War to advocate for the protection of children's rights, meet their 
basic needs and expand their opportunities to reach their full potential, is the largest demander of 
RUTF. Other demanders include the Clinton foundation, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors 
without borders) and other smaller NGOs and UNICEF partners (UNICEF, 2009). UNICEF 
procures these products from international and local (in countries which have a demand for 
RUTF) producers. UNICEF procures RUTF for many organizations including the World Health 
Organization (WHO); the WHO transports and delivers these products to affected areas 
(UNICEF, 2013). UNICEF operates in 190 countries and distributes food and medical supplies 
to children in emergency situations. The supply division is responsible for the procurement of 
RUTF products from global and local suppliers. Currently there are 23 different suppliers, of 
which 18 are local producers found in countries that require a large amount of RUTF (UNICEF, 
2017).  
The price of RUTF varies based on the country of production and the company that produces it. 
Based on 2016 data, the weighted average price of 1 carton of RUTF containing 150 sachets of 
92g each ranges between US $45- $55 for local RUTF and $41-$52 for offshore RUTF 
(UNICEF, 2017). The powdered milk and the packaging aluminum foil are the most expensive 
components. Locally produced RUTF is more expensive due to the need to import the milk 
powder and mineral mix. Over the years, the number of producers and volume of procurement 
have increased which has reduced the price of RUTF. However, prices have not decreased as 
much due to high start-up costs and producing below capacity (Komrska et al., 2013) and there 
are challenges to efficiently incorporate programs that utilize RUTF into a country’s health 
services. Ethiopia has launched the national nutrition strategy in 2008 which included the 
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community management of acute malnutrition that uses RUTF. A case study of five countries 
including Ethiopia found that the challenges of integrating such programs along with other health 
services are the limited capacity of health services, lack of clear definition and indicator of 
integration, difficulty in the transfer of skills and resources to the governance of the program 
and, treating programs that require RUTF as emergency only thus prioritizing other programs 
that have regular funding(UNICEF, 2013).  
 
UNICEF’s quality standards for suppliers of these products are stricter than normal foods as they 
are given to individuals with an already compromised health status. The quality standards 
required for RUTF include no aflatoxin contamination, no bacterial contamination and 
prevention of oxidation (Manary, 2006). Aflatoxin is produced by a fungus, which contaminates 
peanuts after harvest but it can be prevented by keeping the peanuts in a cool dry place or using 
fungicides. Therefore, buyers want to buy from producers who can ensure delivery of peanuts 
that are not contaminated. Bacterial contamination can occur due to the presence of water in the 
product, which facilitates the growth of bacteria and mold. Complete drying of preparation 
materials is thus necessary. Oxidation shortens the shelf life of the product and thus air tight 
containers and packaging under nitrogen must be used as UNICEF requires a two-year shelf life 
for globally sourced RUTF (Caron, 2013). These quality standards are in accordance with 
international food production standards and local government’s food safety standards.   
Most local producers send samples to developed countries to test for contaminants and aflatoxin, 
which increases cost and limits production.  Hilina Enriched foods, which is the local producer 
of Plumpy’Nut in Ethiopia, has partnered with others to establish Bless, a laboratory to locally 
analyze quality and address this challenge (Segre, Liu, & Komrska, 2016). Bless Agri Food 
Laboratory Services, established in 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, is the first accredited private 
food laboratory in the country (Precise, 2014).   
 
2.3 The Supply chain for RUTF 
The supply chain for RUTF is not like the supply of other food products where end users are 
consumers who pay for the products. Users of RUTF are mostly children, mothers and 
HIV\AIDS patients who get the products for free. RUTF is funded through humanitarian action 
and world government support. Donations can be specific to a certain program or just general 
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funding. In 2017, UNICEF required US$110.5 million for its humanitarian program in Ethiopia; 
as of July 2017 it had received US$34.5m and had US$33.5m funds carried over from the 
previous period (UNICEF, 2017).  
 
2.3.1 Product flow 
RUTF manufacturers can be local, global or both. Local manufacturers are producers located in 
countries that are major users of RUTF, like Hilina foods in Ethiopia and Valid Nutrition in 
Malawi. Global manufacturers produce mainly for export, e.g.  Nutriset in France, Insta Products 
in Kenya and Edissa in the USA.  Global producers are required to produce and ship the product 
to an agreed location, mostly the nearest port or airport (Komrska et al., 2013). Most of the 
global RUTF for use in Ethiopia is shipped from Nutriset in France which ships the product 
(Plumpy’nut) to Mombasa (in Kenya) which is then delivered by road to Addis Ababa or it is 
directly air flown from France. After arriving in Addis Ababa, it is transported by truck to 
regional offices and warehouses where it is stored until needed (Swaminathan, 2009).  Some of 
the RUTF manufacturers produce for both local use and export like Meds & Food for Kids in 
Haiti and Samil Industry in Sudan (UNICEF, 2017). Currently there are 23 producers that supply 
to UNICEF (government agencies and other NGO’s procure through UNICEF) of which seven 
are local, 13 are international and the remaining three are both local/international (UNICEF, 
2017).  Figure 2.1 shows the global product flow of one of the RUTF products, in particular the 
Plumpy’Nut in UNICEF’s supply chain.  
 
Figure 2.1 Product flow of Plumpy’Nut in UNICEF’s supply chain. 
 
Source: (Swaminathan, 2009) 
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2.3.2 Information flow  
The needed amount of RUTF is calculated based on surveys that measure the level of 
malnutriton. Based on these surveys the country office and different NGOs write proposals to 
funding agencies. After donors review the proposals and give feedback, UNICEF country offices 
places orders to RUTF manufacturers. RUTF manufacturers communicate the available amount 
and date of arrival while logistic firms communicate information regarding shipment to desired 
locations. Figure 2.2 below shows the information flow for tRUTF in the UNICEF supply chain. 
 
Figure 2.2 Information flow of Plumpy’Nut in UNICEF’s supply chain 
 
Source: (Swaminathan, 2009) 
 
2.3.3 Funding flows in the Plumpy’Nut supply chain 
UNICEF’s country office develops fundraising proposals and different donors make 
commitments to the amount of funds they will give. The funding is given in different 
installments on varied schedules.  Once these funding promises are obtained, the UNICEF 
country office places orders for RUTF. Producers of RUTF and transporters send their bills to 
the supply Division of UNICEF. The UNICEF country office transfers the payment to the supply 
division which then pays these bills.  
 
2.4 Issues in the local and global supply chain of RUTF 
Even though UNICEF is the largest buyer of RUTF, it currently reaches only 15% of those 
suffering from severe acute malnutrition while other agencies that procure RUTF like USAID, 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and others reach only 5% of the people that need RUTF 
(UNICEF, 2017). This fact implies there is a significant need and a non-utilized opportunity in 
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increasing production and improving supply chains to address the large number of the severely 
malnourished population.  
 
A supply chain analysis of RUTF in the Horn of Africa found variability in lead time (time 
between order and delivery), delays in deliver/transportation delays, uneven ordering, lack of 
information sharing among supply chain agents, demand uncertainty and high cost of logistics to 
be the major challenges in the supply chain of RUTF (UNICEF, 2009). Lead time is the length of 
time from the start of production to the final delivery. The lead time for the delivery of RUTF 
was long and variable in the Horn of Africa. Variability in lead time prohibits effective planning 
as it is hard to predict arrival dates for RUF leading to inefficiency, eroding trust and making it 
difficult to plan effectively. Even when dates are set after taking into consideration potential 
interruption in the supply chain, orders arrive later than the set dates. This variability is due to 
long delays at customs, poor local transport infrastructure which restricts the load a truck could 
carry and seasonal roads that are not accessible during rainy season. In emergency situations, air 
transportation has been used to reduce time between order and delivery but air transport raises 
costs by up to 35% (UNICEF, 2009). Since the cost of RUF’s is covered by different funding 
agencies which make commitments before UNICEF makes purchase orders, variable lead time 
makes a quick response to hunger emergencies challenging both in terms of availability of funds 
and product delivery. The high cost of logistics and length of time required for delivery are the 
major challenge in global RUTF supply (UNICEF, 2009).  
 
Uneven ordering is when the demand for RUTF increases during emergencies.  During 
emergencies, the volume of RUTF that is ordered is higher which puts pressure on the 
production lead time (UNICEF, 2009). The limitation in terms of low production 
capacity/volume further puts pressure on lead times. Uncertainty of future demand for RUTF as 
new alternatives to treat malnutrition are developed or the volume of malnourished population 
decreases further limits increased production and private sector involvement. The lack of 
information flow between supply chain actors and lack of correct forecast/ assessment of need 
and demand for RUF affect the performance of the supply chain. Lack of data about forecasts 
and consumption limits proper planning for production and transportation of RUTF.  Uncertainty 
about availability and timing of funding limits production volume. Thus, it becomes a challenge 
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to match demand and supply. The Horn-of- Africa study recommended: the establishment of 
buffer stocks (by RUTF buyers/humanitarian agencies) to reduce lead times and delays in 
delivery; the diversification of RUTF suppliers as it would increase volume and enable better 
supply; improvement of collaboration and communication between agents in the supply chain 
which improves information flow and forecasting (Komrska et al., 2013). 
 
The above-mentioned challenges in the international supply chain have led to local procurement. 
Local procurement solves some of the challenges like delays at shipment and port of 
entry/customs and shortens delivery/transportation time. Local production also provided 
increased familiarity of local community and government with the product. The physical 
presence of local production provides an opportunity for increased attention to malnutrition 
within the country and inclusion of RUTF in the government’s national nutritional strategies 
(Troubé, 2012). The use of local language on the product package also increases the recognition 
of the product (UNICEF, 2009). UNICEF is highly committed to local procurement as it is 
buying local even when local procurement costs 60 percent higher than off-shore (UNICEF, 
2009). The organization has also achieved its plan to supply 50% of total procurement from local 
sources in 2016 (UNICEF, 2017). Additional benefits of local procurement include development 
of local agriculture, promotion of economic self-sufficiency, reduction of risk associated with 
procurement from a single source and increased production capacity (Manary, 2006; UNICEF, 
2009).  
 
Local procurement also has its own challenges in the local supply chain. Locally produced 
RUTF is often found to be more expensive than the imported version due to the need to import 
powdered milk and vitamin and mineral mix that are key ingredients in RUTF (Segre et al., 
2016). The timely arrival of these imported ingredients and the availability of foreign exchange 
and working capital are also challenges in local production (Komrska et al., 2013; Segre et al., 
2016). 
 
In addition to the higher cost of local RUTF, the absence of market institutions (like a stable 
foreign exchange and input market) can cause lack of information and proper market signals 
regarding raw material quality, price and demand which increases transaction costs. Lack of 
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legal institutions to enforce and monitor agreements further increases monitoring costs. In 
addition, patent protection for some RUTFs and related products which require some payment to 
manufacture such products can present a challenge, although Nutriset does not charge a fee in 
developing countries.  In addition, distribution is found to be the most logistically challenging 
step in the supply chain for RUF (Komrska et al., 2013) and local procurement often does not 
solve this distribution challenge due to poor infrastructure. There are also financial challenges in 
local production related to high start-up costs and the willingness of investors to invest in such 
products. Quality control is another obstacle in local production as there is often lack of proper 
grading for agricultural commodities and lack of quality assurance institutions at the food 
processing level (Segre et al., 2016). RUTF has tight quality and nutrient specifications and in 
order to be a supplier, producers need to meet these specifications. Therefore, a lack of facilities 
to provide certification for the fulfillment of these specifications would be a limit to production.  
A study into why local production is not meeting demand in Ethiopia found that lack of market 
information (the price and supply/availability of raw materials), low access to finance(limited 
capacity of manufacturers to expand production, to buy seasonally available local inputs and to 
obtain foreign currency to buy imported inputs) and a weak value chain to be the main issues 
(Isogai, 2011).  
 
2.5 Social capital in supply chains 
Even though the challenges mentioned in the previous sections are current issues, change is 
happening at various levels. Supply chain management in agriculture and food products is 
changing, mainly driven by changes in transportation technology, communication technology, 
modern agricultural practices and technologies, the policy environment and increases in 
consumer incomes. Supply chains are becoming more integrated, complex, and are often likely 
to be international (Reardon, Chen, Minten, & Adriano, 2012). Supply chain organization in 
developing countries, which were and still are, characterized by missing markets, poor transport 
and communication infrastructure, non-conducive policy environments, low use of technological 
advances and high post-harvest loss is also changing (Daniels & Fors, 2015). Non-conducive 
policy environment and low use of technological advances is also changing. The changes are due 
to greater emphasis of governments on agriculture and agricultural policy, the recognition of the 
importance of agriculture in addressing issues in economic development and health; 
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improvements in infrastructure, and adoption of new technologies (Reardon et al., 2012; Alemu, 
Maertens, Deckers, Bauer, & Mathijs, 2016). The development of institutions and markets and 
non-market forces like social capital has also contributed to the way supply chains are organized 
in developing countries.  
 
Social capital is the network of relationships between people that enable cooperation for 
common gain (Putnam,1995).  There are different types of social capital but the emphasis of this 
thesis is the two types of social capital, namely trust and information sharing. In economic 
dealings, better connected agents (social network) can have positive or negative effects.  Better 
connection between trading partners can potentially lead to agreements to collude, charge higher 
prices and control the market with adverse effects on economic welfare.  Alternatively, agents 
with a good social network can reduce transaction costs by eliminating negotiation and search 
costs as they trust each other and share information between them (Fafchamps & Minten, 2002). 
Fafchamps & Minten find that social capital is as important as human capital in improving the 
efficiency of economies, which are characterized by high transaction costs and weak market 
institutions. They find that a positive relationship with other agricultural traders and lenders 
improves the performance of the supply chain by building trust which enables the use of credit 
instead of always demanding cash payment; by exchanging price information; and by reducing 
time spent on inspection of the product’s quality. However, good relationships do not always 
have a positive effect on supply chains as they found that family relationships may affect 
productivity negatively. This could be due to the mixing of family and business matters, though a 
family relationship might be important during the initial stage of a new business. 
 
Social capital particularly reduces transaction costs in markets characterized by weak contract 
enforcement and poorly defined property rights by creating trust between agents (Landa, 1994).  
Opportunism is likely to occur in situations where there is inadequate access to courts and the 
legal system to enforce contracts, in imperfect markets, and where property rights are weak. 
Landa argues that the lack of an effective legal system and market imperfections create/ find 
their own remedies. As frequent transactions occur and some form of information is shared 
during these transactions, a basis for trust and further cooperation is created. Traders develop a 
routine/practices that makes transactions more convenient, resulting in the formation of informal 
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“institutions” that facilitate trade. Entrepreneurs not only engage in exchange but also structure 
the rules of the transaction. Transactions characterized by trust will yield better profits and 
mutually beneficial outcomes. 
  
Middlemen play multiple roles in such settings. They create markets, bring together buyers and 
sellers, they provide information, reduce search costs, exploit economies of scale, and create 
trust between buyer and seller (Landa, 1994)  Middlemen deal with both suppliers and buyers so 
they can create a “ridge of trust” between buyers and sellers who do not trust each other but trust 
the middleman. This trust reduces costs associated with searching for trading partners or prices, 
getting acquainted with partners, negotiating the exchange and the anxiety of getting a good deal 
or being cheated. (Klein, 1997).  
 
A study in China (Zhang & Hu, 2011) found that contracts and trust function as complements. 
Furthermore, a positive relationship between environmental uncertainty and the use of 
contractual governance was found. That is, the more the organization is uncertain about the 
information regarding the situation/environment it is operating under, the more likely they are to 
use contractual agreements.  Another study (Cai et al., 2010) found that legal protection as an 
institutional force did not have any effect on trust or information sharing. This could be due to 
the traditional culture that sees law as an administrative tool unlike in Western countries where 
formal contracts and legal protections provide reassurance. However, traditional systems 
significantly affected the level of trust between trading partners. Informal socialization between 
manufacturing firms  also played a greater role than formal socializations in improving supplier 
relationships in manufacturing firms (Cousins, Handfield, Lawson, & Petersen, 2006). Good 
supplier relationships reduce supply chain costs, increase flexibility and shorten product 
development time by promoting accurate information sharing (Kalyar, Naveed, Anwar, & 
Iftikhar, 2013) . However, very close relationship of supply chain agents was found to negatively 
affect knowledge acquisition as it might have prevented agents from obtaining information from 
other sources and when there is high level of trust the need to monitor action and negotiate deals 
might decrease leading to lower processing of information and thus lower knowledge acquisition 
(Cousins et al., 2006).  
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2.6 Institutions and transaction costs 
Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3).  Institutions (formal and informal) 
are the rules and procedures that shape social interaction. Formal institutions are the official 
structures that include government, markets, labour unions, legal systems, financial institutions, 
courts and grading systems (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). These institutions can impose 
restrictions directly through authoritative orders and indirectly through rules or incentives 
(subsidies or tax). Informal institutions are “unofficial” values and customs that influence 
behavior through social obligations and expectations (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). They can also 
be termed as non-market institutions. Non-market institutions are the interactions between 
different economic agents that are not mediated through the market. These expectations can 
enforce “contracts” even in the absence of government or other formal institutions.  
 Examples of informal/non-market institutions in Ethiopia are Iddir and Ikkub. Ikkub is a 
traditional saving and credit institution with a rotating fund where people form groups and 
contribute a fixed amount of cash into a common pool periodically (weekly, biweekly or 
monthly or any other agreed interval). Then each member of the group receives the whole sum of 
the contribution one after the other based on a lottery system. This fund is usually used by the 
individual to buy expensive consumption goods, to start or expand a business, to save and as 
collateral to borrow from members outside the group. Iddir is another institution, which mainly 
provides financial and moral support during death/funeral service. Members of the group 
contribute small sums of money monthly or biweekly and in return social and financial support is 
provided during funerals. These institutions are common throughout Ethiopia and arise privately 
(without any government involvement or direction) to meet the needs of the community.  
Institutions have been shown to play a major role in supply chain organization and management, 
especially in developing countries (Alemu, Maertens, Deckers, Bauer, & Mathijs, 2016). One of 
the main roles institutions play is lowering transaction costs. The transaction cost approach in 
Economics deals with the transaction as the main unit of analysis, unlike the neoclassical 
approach which considers price analysis and equilibrium as the main points of interest. There are 
three main transaction costs - search, negotiation, and monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Absence of market signal regarding a product’s quality, price or demand creates information 
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search costs, called search costs. For instance, to know the price of chickpea a buyer needs to go 
to the open market and ask around a few shops before determining the on-going price of 
chickpea. Spot market transactions increase time to find buyers and sellers and negotiate 
exchange, creating negotiation costs. E.g.  If there are different quality chickpeas with different 
prices on sale by many different farmers/sellers; one needs to negotiate with individual sellers to 
reach agreement on the quality and price of the chickpea. Lack of legal institutions to enforce 
agreements increases the tendency to violate contracts and it is time consuming to resolve such 
disputes. This creates monitoring and enforcement costs.  
The major reasons for the existence of transaction costs are bounded rationality, opportunism, 
asset specificity and information asymmetry. Bounded rationality refers to an individual’s 
limitation to obtain or process all the information needed to make rational decisions in today’s 
complex world. In addition, bounded rationality limits the completeness of contracts in that 
during the signing/writing of contractual agreements, it is hard to foresee all the issues that might 
arise and thus contracts might not be fully contingent. Therefore, an individual’s action might not 
always be optimal. Opportunism refers to the selfish nature of individuals in seeking their own 
interest at the expense of others. Opportunistic behavior could lead to low information sharing 
between trading partners as one partner hides information about the quality or other 
characteristics of a product.  
Asset specificity arises when one party in the transaction has made a significant investment in 
the relationship that cannot be used easily in other transactions. This could lead one party to act 
opportunistically. For instance, once a processor invests in a facility to produce and test RUTF 
quality, the buyer can lower the price he offers for the end product or require frequent upgrades 
to machinery. The processors would be forced to comply if there are few alternative RUTF 
buyers. Or the processor can demand higher prices since there are no other RUTF producers in 
the region. Information asymmetry refers to the possibility of one or both parties having hidden 
information prior to a transaction or hidden (unobservable) actions following a transaction. This 
can erode trust between trading partners and lead to fewer transactions. When a transaction does 
occur, it becomes less efficient due to the search and negotiation costs. 
In the absence of formal institutions, opportunistic behavior is more likely. When such behavior 
is possible, agribusinesses may prefer to have contracts instead of trading in the spot market 
21 
 
(Hobbs, 1996). A study in Northern Ethiopia has found that product characteristics (quality 
adulteration and perishability), market information and firm characteristics significantly 
influenced agribusiness to conduct transactions through contracts instead of the spot market 
(Alemu & Adesina, 2015). The study also found that credit based payment options, where 
payments can be done later, determine the decision to use contracts. A similar study also found 
traders are more likely to vertically coordinate to get credit from suppliers (Alemu et al., 2016). 
In addition, studies show that farmers using services provided by institutions like credit unions 
have higher farm productivity and that institutions enhance a farmer’s market orientation 
(Gebremedhin et al., 2009). It was found that productivity of honey producers in Northern 
Ethiopia increased when transacting under contract; better access to technology and skill transfer 
were the reasons production increased under contract and having a contractual agreement with a 
trader offered motivations for the farmers to increase production and supply their output to larger 
markets (Alemu et al., 2016).  
  
2.7 Market Institutions and Government Policy in Ethiopia 
Institutions play a role in the development and effectiveness of supply chains. Pressure from 
members in an institution may make firms keep on operating through traditional 
trading/communicating channels rather than adapting new innovations in supply chain 
organizations (Bello, Lohtia, & Sangtani, 2004).  These institutions can have regulative, 
normative, or cultural–cognitive effects. The regulative element refers to the demands of 
governments and regulatory bodies like courts to comply with laws and other requirements. They 
can impose restrictions directly through authoritative orders and indirectly through rules. Or they 
can influence/induce action through incentives in the form of subsidies, taxes and tariffs.  For 
instance, fear of a court ordered sanction for violating a contract can provide enough incentives 
for contract partners to adhere to their agreements. Enforceable contracts or even trust between 
supply chain actors is found to improve logistics performance and confidence in market 
information (Kalyar et al., 2013). Society’s values and norms influence behavior through social 
obligations and expectations. These expectations can enforce “contracts” even in the absence of 
government or other formal institutions. Therefore, trust and informal institutions play a role in 
reducing transaction costs in a supply chain. 
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Governments have promoted the growth and development of efficient supply chains in 
developing countries by investing in and subsidizing the agriculture sector (Reardon et al., 2012). 
Examples are the ways the Indian government has encouraged development through investments 
in research, irrigation canals, transport and communication technology. The Ethiopian 
government has also increased attention to agriculture and agricultural markets (MANR, 2017). 
Although there have been improvements in the Ethiopian agricultural sector over the last few 
years, there is still great potential in terms of improving production and productivity. The major 
factors contributing to low productivity are smallholder farmers’ limited access to modern 
inputs, financial services and agricultural markets (Chaka, Kenea, & Gebresenbet, 2016; Gabre-
Madhin, 2001).  These issues are also some of the challenges in Ethiopia to increasing local 
RUTF production to meet current demand (Isogai, 2011).  
 
In order to address these challenges the government has implemented different policies and 
strategies and has increased expenditure on the agriculture sector. Since 1991 Ethiopia has been 
following Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) that recognizes agriculture as 
the engine of growth. The main purpose of this strategy has been to improve market access, rural 
infrastructure, and access to financial services and promote proper use of land. In line with this 
strategy, both the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) 
and the Five Year Growth and Transformation Plan (FYGTP) established in 2005-2010 and 
2011-2016, respectively have specific agricultural development strategies of establishing 
effective agricultural marketing systems and specialization, diversification and 
commercialization of agricultural production (MOFED, 2006, 2010). 
 
According to the midterm review of the Agriculture Sector Policy and Investment Framework, 
agricultural production of major food crops grew at an annual average rate of 10.3 percent which 
was credited to the rapid adoption of improved agricultural technologies and improved 
infrastructure and access to credit and extension services (Chipeta et al., 2015). During the first 
FYGTP, the use of chemical fertilizers increased by 10 percent per annum in terms of area to 
which they were applied, and by 24 percent in terms of quantity. Similarly, the area benefiting 
from improved seeds increased by 24 percent per annum, while the seed quantity increased by 17 
percent per annum. But the program was not as effective as expected in addressing smallholder 
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farmers because households are heterogeneous and a specific policy was not set to take this into 
consideration (Chipeta et al., 2015). Some of the specific programs launched and institutions 
established aimed at addressing smallholder farmers and agricultural markets are discussed 
below.  
2.7.1 Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX)  
The establishment of the Ethiopian Commodity exchange (ECX) in April 2008 by the 
government of Ethiopia was intended to improve the efficiency of the agricultural market and 
decrease market costs. According to the institution’s statement, the mission of the ECX is to 
connect all buyers and sellers in an efficient, reliable, and transparent market to create 
opportunity for growth in the commodity sector and create industry linkage (ECX, 2009). It was 
established to deal with marketing export commodities, minimize the involvement of middle 
men in the supply chain and provide a price signal to farmers to lower the high disparity between 
end-user prices and farm gate prices at which farmers sell their produce. The ECX mainly deals 
with coffee, sesame, haricot beans, maize and wheat (ECX, 2009). It facilitates long-term legally 
binding contracts between farmers and traders, which is believed to reduce market risk. ECX 
works with 11 settlement banks to facilitate trading. It also has a Compliance Division which 
monitors and enforces member’s contracts and an Arbitration Tribunal to deal with disputes 
between members or between the company and members (ECX, 2009). It benefits small- scale 
farmers, by providing better access to information regarding quality and prices of product which 
improves their profit by lowering their market cost. The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange has 
warehouses in 16 major locations in Ethiopia which offer an integrated warehouse system from 
the purchase of quality commodities based on the grades and standards for each traded 
commodity to the ultimate delivery of end-users (ECX, 2009). Commodities are deposited in 
warehouses operated by ECX in major surplus regions of the country. At the ECX warehouse, 
commodities are sampled, weighed and graded using grading technology and weighing 
equipment and then certified. Sales occur through open outcry trading system, there are more 
than 200 different spot contracts that are traded by the ECX members (ECX, 2009).  
 
ECX disseminates market information to all market actors through rural based market 
information ticketers, mobile phone short messaging services (SMS), mass media and its 
website. Electronic displays, located in 200 strategically selected regional market sites, put on 
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view the traded commodities prices, commodity offers to sell and bids to buy in real time (less 
than 4 seconds) (ECX, 2009)  
 
Currently only major export commodities like coffee, sesame, haricot bean, in addition to maize 
and wheat are the commodities handled by the company. It is illegal to trade coffee or sell export 
quality coffee on domestic markets since 2009 (FAO, 2014). Though it has been argued that a 
significant amount of foreign currency has been earned through improved markets for exports, 
specifically through coffee (ECX, 2009), an expansion in terms of including other commodities 
would further improve the market for agriculture and reduce transaction costs as it provides 
market information, grades and certifies commodities, and monitors contract enforcement in 
partnership with partner financial institutions. The positive and significant impact of ECX on the 
Ethiopian coffee price has been disputed (Hernandez, Rashid, Lemma, & Kuma, 2017) but the 
institution’s performance with respect to other commodities and other dynamics is not yet fully 
assessed.  
2.7.2 The Ethiopia Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE)  
The Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise was established by the Ethiopian government in 1949 
under a different name but it has been renamed and reorganized through the years to its current 
role of purchasing grain, oilseeds, coffee and pulses for local wholesale and export. The 
Enterprise has 10 branch offices and 91 trade centers throughout the country. It procures and 
exports chickpea among different pulses. It buys different pulses from wholesalers and 
smallholders and supplies it to consumers, local food processing companies, the government and 
non-governmental organizations. It generates a significant foreign currency and income for the 
country through the sale and export of oilseeds, coffee and pulses (EGTE, 2017). In addition to 
supplying commodities, it owns and rents storage facilities, owns heavy and light trucks to 
facilitate transportation and provide transportation service when required, operates cleaning and 
bulk packing facilities, grades and issues quality certificate (EGTE, 2014). Its main role is to 
stabilize local agricultural markets and to promote export of agricultural commodities.  
  
2.7.3 Agricultural Growth program (AGP)  
The Agricultural Growth Program (AGP), established in 2011 is a wide-ranging program with 
the aim of creating sustainable growth in agriculture. It is part of the five-year growth and 
transformation plan that had existed earlier but the current program is more focused on 
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underdeveloped areas (woredas). It currently works in 96 woredas to increase the 
competitiveness of value chains and the productivity of actors in the supply chain - this includes 
smallholders, commercial farmers, traders, processors and exporters. The targeted commodity 
value chains are Sesame, Chickpea, Coffee, Honey, Wheat, Maize, Teff, Barley, Livestock, 
Meat, Dairy and Sorghum (Berhane et al., 2013). 
 
AGP-Agribusiness Market development program which is one of the programs under AGP has 
been successful in establishing “market linkages for Farmers’ Cooperative Unions (FCUs), 
assisting FCUs in obtaining seats at the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX), facilitating 
more exports by funding the construction of warehouses and promoting out grower schemes as a 
way to control the quality of available output for trade” (USAID, 2012). 
 
2.7.4 Financial Institutions and Cooperatives 
The expansion of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (with more than 700 branches in the 
country), cooperative banks and emergence of government backed microfinance institutions in 
Ethiopia is expected to improve smallholders access to financial services and loans which could 
be used to invest in farm land and productivity. But banks are reluctant to loan to the agricultural 
sector as it is perceived riskier due to fluctuating prices and its dependence on natural conditions. 
The Ethiopian government has stated its strong interest in providing financial institutions for the 
agriculture sector but the increased financial investment to other sectors/projects have made it 
harder for agri-business to access financial services (USAID, 2012).  
Cooperative membership has been found to have varying effects for different farmers. Studies 
found that agricultural cooperative membership positively impacted fertilizer adoption while 
non- agricultural cooperatives memberships had a mixed impact on farmers in Ethiopia (Abebaw 
& Haile, 2013). Being a member of a cooperative was found to reduce the farmers’ probability of 
participation in wholesale, retail and consumer markets which usually have better price offers 
than farm gate trading (Tefera, 2014). Another study has found the effects of microfinance 
institutions to be contrary to expectations and had relatively no impact on increasing agricultural 
incomes (Tarozzi, Desai, & Johnson, 2015). The slow process of deciding and signing a contract 
has also affected the performance of farmers in cooperative unions (USAID, 2012).Since 
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cooperatives have failed to effectively address the small holder financial needs, it calls for an 
analysis of another “institution” that might be effective.  
 
2.8 Market Structure and supply chain of chickpea  
As has been discussed, agricultural supply chains in Ethiopia face a number of challenges 
including poor information flow, lack of transport and warehouse services (Chaka et al., 2016).  
The supply chains of chickpea which can be used as an ingredient in RUTF production, and is 
the primary focus of this thesis, is no different.  
 
Chickpea is mainly produced in select areas of Amhara (North Gondar) and Oromia (West 
Showa), regions accounting for 92% of total production (AGP, 2017). Figure 2.3 shows the 
regions where chickpea is primarily grown. Ethiopia mainly produces the Kabuli and Desi type 
of chickpea. Kabuli is larger and has a creamy white colored seed coat while the Desi chickpea, 
which is more widely grown in Ethiopia, has a smaller size and a reddish- brown colored seed 
coat (Kassie et al., 2009). Chickpea has high resistance to drought and farmers grow it after the 
main rainy season has passed which allows them to grow a second crop (Kassie et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 2.3 Primary chickpea growing regions in Ethiopia 
 
Source: EIAR, MOH and EATA, 2013 
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Production volumes of chickpea have been increasing through the years though the crop is not 
well established and other crops like teff still dominate overall production. However, from the 
different pulses grown chickpea accounted for 15% of total production and 14% of total land in 
2014; faba bean and haricot bean combined take 50% of both the land and total production of 
pulses (Kassie et al., 2009; Ojiewo, 2016). Chickpea production has grown over the years though 
the areas of production have remained the same. The increase in production volumes is mainly 
due to increase in productivity/yield of the crop. Figure 2.4 shows the trend in Ethiopia in 
chickpea productivity, land allocation (area) and production amount from 2004 to 2016. The 
figure shows that the area of land allocated to chickpea has increased by 24% in 2016 from its 
value in 2004 while production has increased by 173% in 2016 from its initial value in 2004. 
Adoption of improved varieties of chickpea increased from 30% in 2007 to 80% in 2014. Eighty 
percent of the chickpea produced is sold in the local market due to low volume available for 
export, unreliable supply, failure to meet quality standards and numerous actors in the supply 
chain that make it long and increase transaction costs. These factors reduce the incentive for the 
increased involvement of exporters. Ethiopia’s chickpea exports account for 63% of total 
chickpea export in the continent. However, it accounts for only 4% of the world export in value 
and volume.  
Figure 2.4 Trend in chickpea production, yield and area harvested in Ethiopia 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2017 
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There are three major market structures classified as primary, secondary and tertiary markets 
based on the different actors involved in the supply chain (Abera, 2010). Primary markets are 
rural spot markets where most smallholder farmers sell their outputs. They mostly sell to nearby 
rural actors (travel between 1- 10 km to reach the primary markets) like direct to consumers, 
rural assemblers and retailers, brokers, and primary cooperatives. Farmers bring their produce by 
carrying it on their back, by donkey or by horse driven carts.  Primary markets, administered by 
the municipality, are usually held once a week and smallholder farmers trade small quantities 
(20kg-300kg).  There is a slight price difference among buyers based on negotiation skills but 
there is no clear quality grading mechanism except by visual examination of size, color, pest 
damage and amount of foreign material in the chickpea. Chickpea price increases as it moves 
further from the area of production so farmers may also take their produce to a woreda (a small 
administrative division) markets based on distance, transport cost and price differential in order 
to sell to consumers, wholesalers and retailers at the woreda level (Abera, 2010).  
 
Secondary markets are markets at the woreda level where produce is exchanged in larger 
quantities and rural assemblers and rural retailers sell chickpea to woreda and urban wholesalers, 
urban retailers and consumers. There is no standard grading technique at this stage either except 
for visual inspection. Tertiary markets are markets that include urban wholesalers, processors, 
exporters, small retailers and supermarkets. Urban wholesalers are the major supplier to urban 
retailers and exporters and are based in the major market (Merkato) in Addis Ababa, the capital 
city of Ethiopia (Abera, 2010). Urban wholesalers use mainly brokers (agents) to buy and sell 
chickpea from and to different actors in the supply chain. It is difficult to trace the accurate 
origin of chickpea delivered to the wholesalers. But wholesalers sell chickpea to retailers, 
processors, supermarkets and exporters in Addis Ababa and other chickpea deficit areas in the 
country as chickpea is mainly produced in the Amhara and Oromia regions. The Ethiopian Grain 
Trade Enterprise also buys and sells chickpea in addition to the wholesalers in the tertiary 
markets (EGTE, 2017).   
 
At the tertiary market level, there are two types of processor - large food-processing companies 
like FAFA, Health Food, Green Star and Guts Agro that buy large amounts of chickpea from 
wholesalers and brokers mainly in Addis Ababa and small-scale business that buy small 
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quantities from wholesalers from the nearest market to process traditional chickpea based foods  
like Shiro powder (ground chickpea with spices) and Kolo (roasted chickpea) to the local 
markets (Abera, 2010). Due to the government promotion of Micro and Small Scale Enterprise 
development, especially in the food processing sector, small food processing business are many 
in number and face the challenge of hard competition. Exporters own their own buying points in 
major towns, cleaning and grading facilities and are highly organized. A number of pulse 
exporters have come together and formed the Ethiopian Pulses, Oilseeds and Spices Processors 
and Exporters Association (EPOSPEA) as major pulses are not handled by the Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange. The objectives of the association are to “establish market information and 
market linkage, build advocacy capacity and strategy on policy formulation process, provide 
training service for members, and create participation opportunities in international trade fair and 
exhibitions” (EPOSPEA, 2017). The Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise is also an exporter of 
chickpea (EGTE, 2017). 
 
Most farmers sell at the primary market/spot market where prices are lower due to transportation 
cost and lack of resources to produce large quantities to make travel worthwhile to a woreda, 
where prices are higher. (Shiferaw & Teklewold, 2007). The actors at the bottom of the chickpea 
supply chain are the urban retailers and supermarkets that trade the final product-processed or 
unprocessed- chickpea to end-users. Supermarkets get their supply of chickpea from processors 
and urban wholesalers while urban retailers get their supply mainly from urban wholesalers. 
Brokers and transporters play an important role in each stage of the supply chain and grading 
facilities play an important role at the tertiary market level (Shiferaw & Teklewold, 2007). The 
value chains that exist in the chickpea market are identified below in Figure 2.5.  
 
The product moving along the value chain experiences little change in form - mainly 
unprocessed chickpea passes along the supply chain. Lack of grading and quality control 
systems, and asymmetry of information, especially about export demand and prices are also 
severe constraints in chickpea marketing (Abera, 2010; Shiferaw & Teklewold, 2007).  
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Figure 2.5 Marketing Channels and value chains of Chickpea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Abera, 2010; Shiferaw & Teklewold, 2007)  
 
A study in the Aba-Liben woreda in Ethiopia found that Desi Chickpea producers sold their 
products to long standing customers at a lower price while producers selling to new customers 
sold at a higher price (Shiferaw & Teklewold, 2007). This was explained as a reduced 
information/search cost associated with regular customers and the additional search cost of 
looking for a new customer. In the same region, the quality of chickpea did not increase its price 
as grading existed only at the export level and not in the primary markets. In markets where 
grading exists quality fetches a better price. The major challenges in the chickpea supply chain 
include lack of information regarding changing prices and demand; quality requirements; lack of 
grading equipment and facilities; low productivity and production level due to lack of access and 
knowledge on the use of pesticide and improved seed (USAID, 2012).  
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2.8.1 Transaction costs in chickpea supply chains  
Chickpea farmers trading in primary and secondary markets incur high negotiation costs, 
especially price negotiation due to several reasons. First, the limited options they have in selling 
their produce in other markets puts them at a disadvantage to the buyers who threatens to not buy 
unless the price is reduced. As could be observed in many markets around Ethiopia, a 
considerable amount of time is lost in negotiating price between traders. Second, lack of standard 
quality or grades in both commodities gives a reason for buyers to demand a lower price due to 
quality uncertainty or the producer to demand higher price claiming that his products quality is 
high. Such arguments take the time and energy of both the buyer and producer and appear 
legitimate as it is only by visual inspection that quality is determined. In the traditional market, 
chickpea is identified based on its area of production (origin). However, the most popular 
method currently is grading based on physical observation, amount of dirt (foreign matter), bean 
size and color, damage due to pests or handling.  Modern methods of chickpea grading are done 
only at the export market level based on the Ethiopian Quality and Standards Authority (EQSA) 
criteria.  
 
The absence or inaccessibility of standard quality and grading facilities by farmers makes 
monitoring or enforcing pre-determined arrangements or contracts difficult as farmers can put 
the visibly better looking crop at the top and the lower quality crop at the bottom and sell the 
whole at the higher quality price. The mixing of different quality is a phenomena observed by 
any customers who has ever bought large quantity of grains from farmers selling their output at a 
road-side. The absence of traceability makes such opportunistic behaviour by the farmer more 
likely. This can be reduced if frequent transactions occur but since most producers sell small 
quantities, consumers, wholesalers or processors who buy from numerous sellers could not 
effectively identify which crop is whose. This monitoring cost makes transactions in such 
circumstances undesirable. This leads to a longer supply chain as buyers try to find a broker or 
an agent/broker who knows producers at the primary market (through frequent purchase) and try 
to buy chickpea through these agents. This cost can go beyond a one-time cost in developing 
countries as trading happens with numerous and varying sellers as the desired quantity cannot 
always be obtained from a single source or the same source every time. This is due to farmers 
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selling different amounts of their crop based on their need for cash and on the amount of produce 
they harvest.   
Food processing companies and traders in Ethiopia have problems securing a constant supply of 
different inputs as signing of contracts is not easy due to trust issues; the cost of signing contracts 
with a high number of smallholders - each supplying a small amount; the violation of signed 
contracts and lack of judicial courts where legal action could be taken on defaulters; the low 
share of price that farmers receive are some of the reasons that push transaction costs higher and 
limit participation in existing agricultural markets (Alemu & Adesina, 2015; Gabre-Madhin, 
2001; Jabbar, Benin, Gabre-Madhin, & Paulos, 2008). 
 
2.9 Performance measures in agri-food and humanitarian supply chains 
In addition to the level of transaction costs that can measure the effectiveness of supply chains, 
there are other elements that can measure the effectiveness of supply chains. This section 
discusses the different performance measures used in agri-food and humanitarian supply chains. 
Performance indicators are the criteria with which the performance of products, services and 
production processes can be evaluated. A performance indicator helps to inform whether 
set/planned goals/targets are met; identify sources and areas of inefficiencies; discover where 
there is potential for improvement; compare competing alternative systems; and better inform the 
design and management of supply chains (Beamon, 1998).The conflicting goals of supply chain 
actors which prevents sharing of information which has strategic value to one firm but also to the 
overall performance of the supply chain makes information sharing and performance 
measurement difficult and complex (Aramyan, Oude Lansink, van der Vorst, & van Kooten, 
2007). However different methods have been applied to measure supply chain performance 
despite these challenges. The main indicators used in the literature are discussed below. 
Measures can be either qualitative or quantitative.  
 
Qualitative measures are measures that do not have a direct numerical measurement but they can 
later be quantified for analysis. Qualitative measures include customers’ satisfaction, flexibility, 
information and material flow integration, risk management and supplier performance. Customer 
satisfaction is the satisfaction with a product or a service before purchase, during purchase and 
support given after purchase (during use of the product). Flexibility is the capacity of the supply 
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chain to deal with random changes or fluctuation in demand or other variables. Information 
integration is the level of information communicated within a supply chain. Material flow is how 
effectively materials are transported along the chain. Effective risk management is a measure of 
how agents in the supply chain manage the effects of the risk that is present due to uncertainty 
and opportunism. Supplier performance is the measure of the regularity of supplier in timely and 
in good condition delivery of raw materials. 
 
Quantitative performance measures are directly described numerically. They can be based either 
on cost and profits or customer responsiveness.  Measures based on cost include cost 
minimization, sales and profit maximization. Measures based on customer responsiveness 
include lead time minimization (time from production start date to end date), response time 
minimization (time from order placement to delivery to customer), maximize the number of 
customers whose orders are filled on time, product lateness minimization (minimize time 
between promised delivery date and actual delivery date). 
In addition to the above measures, a study built a conceptual model to measure supply chain 
performance for small and medium scale agricultural markets in developing countries based on 
marketing performance that include effectiveness, efficiency, adaptability, food quality and 
customer satisfaction  (Mutonyi & Gyau, 2013). Marketing margins and long-term buyer seller 
relationships (trust, satisfaction and power dependence) have also been used to  measure 
performance in agricultural settings (Batt, 2003).  
Humanitarian supply chains are different from other product supply chains and there is a need to 
adopt performance measures that are sensitive to such chains. The commercial supply chain aims 
to maximize profit and customer satisfaction while the humanitarian supply chain’s main goal is 
to save as many lives as possible while efficiently using donor funds. Key success factors which 
measure whether an organization is meeting its objectives in the strategic, tactical and 
operational levels can be used to assess the success of humanitarian supply chain (Freund, 1988 
as cited in Abidi, Leeuw, & Klumpp, 2013). The strategic level is an organization’s 
plan/direction in deciding how to use its available resources. The tactical level is the method 
used to achieve the plans of the organization while the operational level links the strategic plans 
to the tactical methods (Awan, 2016).  
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Strategic, tactical and operational measures that are key success factors in humanitarian supply 
chains include sustainability, beneficiary involvement, qualified and experienced staff, inventory 
management, quality management, coordination, speed, flexibility and cost efficiency (Abidi, 
Leeuw, & Klumpp, 2013). Humanitarian projects have to be sustainable in such a way that 
affected areas are resilient and can develop the capacity to avoid humanitarian crisis in the 
further or deal with them effectively if they occur. Building sustainability and cooperation of 
local personnel is an important strategic measure of success. Standardized procedures and 
continuous care while the aid is required are additional strategic measures. Abdi et al (2013) 
outline factors (Table 2.1) that are key to a successful humanitarian supply chain based on a case 
study of four humanitarian aid agencies.  
Table 2.1 Key success factors for humanitarian supply chains  
Strategic level Tactical level Operational level 
 Sustainability 
 Cooperation 
 Performance 
measurement 
 Standardization of 
relief items, processes 
 Growth 
 Security 
 Independence and 
impartiality 
 Continuum of care 
 Coordination  
 Beneficiary involvement 
 Proper assessment and 
planning 
 Qualified and 
experienced staff 
 Inventory management 
 Long-term contracts 
 Quality management  
 Speed  
 Flexibility 
 Local procurement 
 Order management 
 Cost efficiency 
 Enough staff 
members in the 
field 
 Availability of 
relief items 
Source: Abdi et al., 2013 
The key success factors outlined in table 2.1 are used to qualitatively evaluate the RUF supply 
chain in Ethiopia. The funding and financial resources are addressed in the strategic level 
through measures that include sustainability, security and continuum of care. The interviews 
carried out with different stakeholders are discussed in the context of the above identified 
success indicators in humanitarian supply chains.  
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2.10 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework in this section builds upon the literature review discussed above 
which shows the positive role institutions play in improving the supply chain organization by 
lowering transactions costs. The framework includes the relationship between institutions, social 
capital and transaction cost along with the performance measures of supply chain to tie together 
the points discussed in the literature review. This section further discusses the components of the 
conceptual framework found in Figure 2.6. The discussion regarding institutions in this thesis 
primarily relates to domestic institutions. International institutions are also discussed as they do 
play a role in the RUF supply chains as international agencies are the main donors and buyers of 
RUF in Ethiopia. However they are not discussed in detail in terms of their role in lowering 
transaction costs or building/strengthening social capital.   
Trust is an important element in explaining the behaviour of economic agents in economic 
transactions. Just as individuals’ actions made in their own self interest will also be in the interest 
of all economic agents, the trust between economic agents is an important element in economic 
transactions (Berg, Dickhaut, & Mccabe, 1995). Some degree of trust is also necessary for any 
transaction to take place. The economic theory addressing trust is based on reciprocity and 
reputation (Greif, 1993), suggesting that a person who acts in a trustworthy manner today can be 
trusted to act in a trustworthy manner tomorrow. One can build trust either by multiple repeated 
transactions or by observing how an economic agent acts in transactions with others. Reciprocity 
is acting in a particular way in the hope that others will act similarly. The trust/investment game 
carried out by Berg and colleagues, where two participants who do not know each other receive 
and give back money, shows that people have the tendency to reciprocate. The rules of the game 
are that the first partner has to send some money (including sending zero) to the other player. 
The amount the first player sends will be tripled by the experimenter and given to the second 
player. The second player likewise has to give back some money (including not sending 
anything) to the first player who sent him money. The result shows, unlike the prediction of 
economic theory that the first player sent about half of the original money and the second player 
sent back an amount greater than the original amount he received. A repetition of the experiment 
in different places and conditions has given similar results providing evidence that in economic 
dealings people have the tendency to reciprocate and trust the person they are dealing with in the 
expectation that it will be mutually beneficial (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). 
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This study examines the role of trust between trading partners in the Northern Ethiopia chickpea 
market. Though some level of trust is present in any transaction, an increased level of trust 
among trading partners or the perception of being trusted increases participation in transactions 
that would not have happened without that level of trust  (Blandon, Henson, & Cranfield, 2009).  
Trust between trading partners also facilitates coordination among traders and improves the 
efficiency of a transaction (Dyer & Chu, 2003). In Northern Ethiopia, where markets for small 
scale agricultural products are either missing or are weak, trust can aid in the undertaking of 
transactions by minimizing the fear of opportunistic behaviour. Trust reduces costs associated 
with searching for trading partners or prices, getting acquainted with partners, negotiating the 
exchange and the anxiety of getting a good deal or being cheated (Klein, 1997). Trust has also 
been found to improve the rate trading partners are able to respond to changes in demand or 
supply (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002). Trust also improves logistic performance and the 
confidence of agents regarding prices and quality (Cai, Jun, & Yang, 2010), 
Institutions are the frameworks that guide how humans interact with each other (North, 1990). 
They are the rules and procedures that shape social interaction and trading relationships. The 
absence or presence of institutions affect the trading relationship between partners through 
facilitating or impeding the way for information sharing, trust and cooperation (Cai, Jun, & 
Yang, 2010). The presence of effectively functioning institutions can build trust by imposing 
proper behavior through the provision of incentives for trusting a trading partner or the 
punishment or reduced gain from acting opportunistically or not trusting a partner.  The presence 
of institutions and institutional systems can also build trust in transactions through the 
enforcement of contracts as default can be effectively traced or litigated (Hobbs, 2004; Zhang & 
Hu, 2011). Institutions have been shown to play a major role in supply chain organization and 
management, especially in developing countries (Alemu, Maertens, Deckers, Bauer, & Mathijs, 
2016). Institutions through the development of trust and facilitation of information sharing can 
improve the performance of the supply chain. Institutions might also provide channels and 
opportunity to share information. However, institutions, particularly formal institutions that are 
characterized by corruption or biases can negatively affect trust and information sharing. 
Individuals might avoid the use of these institutions, prefer other informal institutions, or use 
formal institutions with caution as they believe they are corrupt and would not serve their best 
interest.  
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Transaction costs are the costs of obtaining information regarding transacting partners and terms 
of the transaction, negotiating a deal, and enforcing the terms of that deal are met. These costs 
can be high such that they might prevent a transaction from happening or they can alter the 
nature of the transaction (Coase, 2013). For instance, to mitigate transaction costs that arise from 
legal costs of signing a contract which addresses all the issues involved in carrying out a 
particular business, agents might revert to the spot market or integrate their businesses which 
might not be desirable had it not been for the transaction costs. Therefore, reducing or 
eliminating these costs is beneficial for all transaction parties.  
The performance of the supply chain could be measured through flexibility, responsiveness, 
efficiency and product quality (Aramyan, Oude Lansink, van der Vorst, & van Kooten, 2007). 
Flexibility is the ability to adjust to change in market conditions. It could be measured by how 
the supply chain handles change in volume requirement, change in delivery time or level of 
customer satisfaction (Beamon, 1998). Information sharing could facilitate the communication of 
these changes and the subsequent expectations and required actions which reduced frustration 
and unmet expectations between partners. Responsiveness is how quickly and effectively 
products are delivered, it could be measured by the amount of orders that arrive on time and the 
length of time it takes to produce and deliver a product. Trust between trading relationship have 
been found to improve the responsiveness of supply chains (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002 ).  
Efficiency could be measured through production, distribution and transaction costs. A 
minimization of these costs could lead to a more efficient supply chain. One of the roles 
institutions play is lowering transaction costs. Transaction costs are the cost of making a 
transaction.  The existence of trust and information sharing reduce transaction costs by reducing 
the time and resource trading partners spend in searching for information regarding price and 
demand; by reducing time and resource spend in negotiating a transaction as trading partners are 
less likely to question the offer another partner makes as they trust the price offered is fair and 
one is not being cheated or taken advantage of; by reducing resources spent in guarding against 
default and enforcing agreements.  
The other measure of supply chain performance is product quality which is measured in terms of 
shelf-life, product safety, product reliability and convenience (Aramyan et al., 2007). Institutions 
can facilitate product quality by providing facilities and standardized procedures to effectively 
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test the quality of a product and increase convenience and reliability. This does not mean that 
low quality products signal poor performance of the supply chain. A firm may choose a niche 
market of a low quality good with a corresponding low price. It rather measures the availability 
and proper identification of the desired quality, whether high or low quality.   
The schematic representation of the conceptual framework is shown in Figure 2.6 below. The 
relationship between social capital and transaction costs and performance indicators is also 
bidirectional. A responsive, flexible supply chain enhances information sharing and trust. Lower 
transaction costs and an efficient system will also further promote information sharing and make 
information communication easier and information more easily accessible. Trust is also further 
strengthened by a system that has a history or reputation of efficiency and reduced production 
and transaction costs. Information sharing and trust also have a bidirectional relationship as trust 
increases information sharing between economic agents and information sharing trading partners 
trust each other. Though there is the problem of imperfect information which has the potential to 
change the interaction between institutions and individuals, it is not modelled in this framework.   
Figure 2.6 The conceptual framework 
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2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the development of RUTF products and the supply chain challenges in 
both global and local production and delivery of the product. Major challenges include long 
delivery time, high transportation cost and expensive imported ingredients.  The supply chain 
and the existing transaction costs in the chickpea sector which could possibly be used in the 
formulation of new, locally sourced RUTF has also been discussed. The challenges in these 
supply chains include weak legal institutions and absence of quality assurance and grading 
facilities. Social capital and its role in terms of improving supply chain performance by reducing 
transaction costs through building trust and increasing information has also been discussed. Key 
performance indicators could be used to measure the efficiency of the supply chain, to identify 
the major bottle necks in these supply chains and work towards a solution. Taken together, these 
elements inform the conceptual framework that is used to examine the role of informal 
institutions and trust in chickpea-based RUTF supply chains in Ethiopia. 
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Chapter 3 : Empirical Methods and Results 
3.1 Hypothesis of the study 
Based on the conceptual framework developed in the previous section (section 2.10), this section 
states and tests a set of hypotheses. The hypotheses are developed based on the discussion in the 
conceptual framework and the literature review. The main research question of this thesis which 
is how informal institutions affect level of trust and information sharing in the RUF supply chain 
in Ethiopia is examined through the set of six hypotheses stated in this section. The other issue 
which the study intended to examine was the role the level of trust and information sharing 
played in household involvement in contractual agreements regarding chickpea marketing. 
However, the small number of observations obtained from the survey regarding contractual 
agreements (very few households with contractual agreements regarding chickpea) has limited 
the analysis. The initial examination of the relationship with trust and contractual agreements 
used a logistic regression model with contractual agreement as the dependent variable. Further 
discussion of the model and the results obtained from the trust regression analysis are attached in 
Appendix A.  
 Trust between trading partners facilitates coordination among traders and improves the 
efficiency of a transaction (Dyer & Chu, 2003). In Northern Ethiopia, where markets for small 
scale agricultural products are either missing or are weak, trust can aid in the undertaking of 
transactions by minimizing the fear of opportunistic behaviour. Trust reduces costs associated 
with searching for trading partners or prices, getting acquainted with partners, negotiating the 
exchange and the anxiety of getting a good deal or being cheated (Klein, 1997). Trust has also 
been found to improve the rate trading partners are able to respond to changes in demand or 
supply (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002). Trust also improves logistic performance and the 
confidence of agents regarding prices and quality (Cai, Jun, & Yang, 2010).Drawing upon these 
insights, the first hypothesis of this study is as follows.  
H1: An increase in trust between trading partners is associated with a reduction in transaction 
cost related with chickpea marketing.  
Trust is built based on a number of factors. According to Greif (1993), trust is built either by 
repetitive transactions where frequent dealing with trading partners establishes trust, or through 
the reputation of a partner in his dealing with other partners. In line with this theory reputation of 
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a trading partner is used as an indicator of trust in the model described in figures 3.1 and 3.2 
below. In addition, an agent’s judgment of the reliability, credibility, goodwill, ability and 
integrity of trading partners and satisfaction with trading partners is used to measure trust in 
transactions (Blandon et al., 2009; Yee & Yeung, 2010).  Close relationship with and confidence 
in a trading partner are the additional two measures of trust that are relevant to this study. Trust 
can also be measured from the risk perspective where the level of trust is measured based on the 
agent’s perception of the riskiness of the relationship/partnership (Laeequddin, Sahay, Sahay, & 
Abdul Waheed, 2010). That is, trust is the willingness to participate in a transaction with the 
belief that the probability of an agent acting in one’s favour is high (Williamson, 1993).  
However, even though included in the survey question for this study, risk is not used as a 
measure of trust in the model as the factor analysis (discussed below) failed to group it with the 
other measures of trust. The selection of these three indicator variables (reputation, close 
relationship, and confidence in trading partner) is discussed further in the methodology section.  
Trust in exchange relationships also improves information sharing and coordination (Dyer & 
Chu, 2003). Information sharing can also reciprocally enhance trust in trading partners. 
Information sharing improves the level of trust by lowering uncertainty (Kwon and Suh, 2004). 
Good supplier relationships reduces supply chain costs and increases flexibility by promoting 
accurate information sharing (Kalyar, Naveed, Anwar, & Iftikhar, 2013). Hilary, Sseguya, & 
Kibwika (2017) found that the level, type and quality of information sharing was determined by 
the level of trust in rice value chains in Uganda. The four indicators of information sharing in the 
conceptual model described in figure 3.1 and 3.2 are extracted from 17 survey questions using 
both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. Based on the literature discussed, the 
following hypothesis is tested in the model: 
H2: An increase in information sharing between trading partners is associated with an increase 
in trust between trading partners.   
The absence or presence of institutions affects the trading relationship between partners through 
facilitating or impeding information sharing, trust and cooperation (Cai et al., 2010). The 
presence of effectively functioning institutions can build trust by imposing proper behaviour 
through the provision of incentives for trusting a trading partner or the punishment or reduced 
gain from acting opportunistically or not trusting a partner.  Institutions might also provide the 
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avenues and opportunity to share information.  Memberships in institutions such as cooperatives 
or farmers organizations was also found to lower transaction costs, increase marketed output and 
strengthen negotiating power (Barrett et al., 2012). 
Grief (1993) and Landa (1997) both discuss non-market institutions that play a significant role in 
economic transactions. Their study of non-market institutions in different periods in history 
emphasised the importance of the interrelation between political, societal and economic factors. 
Non-market institutions refer to the interaction between different economic agents that is not 
mediated through the market. Landa discusses how “middlemen” create markets, connect buyers 
and sellers, provide information, reduce search costs, and create trust between buyer and seller. 
Grief discusses how 11th century tradesmen of the Maghribi tribe formed coalitions that had 
implicit contractual agreements and specific information-transmission rules. These coalitions 
reduced the opportunistic behavior of trading partners and created a reliable transaction 
environment based on reputation.  Even when a merchant no longer had the intention of 
continuing a relation with other merchants, he dealt fairly and favorably with him to preserve his 
reputation. Greif mentions the story of a merchant who was handling another merchant’s pepper. 
Prices were low for the product and they were getting even worse so for fear that price would go 
down further, the merchant sold his partner’s pepper on the day a certain ship was departing. 
However, after this ship departed, another one arrived with buyers looking for pepper, so he sold 
his own pepper for a better price. To avoid appearing as a dishonest handler or not looking well 
after his partners dealings, he shared the profits from his own pepper sale with this partner even 
though he made it clear that he no longer wants to handle this partners business in the future. 
Other multiple stories are mentioned by Greif that show traders going the extra mile to guard 
their reputation or other traders losing profits due to ruined reputations. Even when formal 
market institutions exist informal institutions have been found to complement these institutions 
to improve market performance (Cai et al., 2010; Zhang & Hu, 2011). This study examines the 
role of such institutions in economic transactions, focusing on five formal and informal 
institutions to which survey participants belonged. The following four hypotheses are tested.  
H3: Membership in informal institutions is associated with an increase in information sharing 
between trading partners 
43 
 
H4: Membership in formal institutions is associated with an increase in information sharing 
between trading partners 
H5: Membership in informal institutions is associated with an increase in trust between trading 
partners. 
H6: Membership in formal institutions is associated with an increase in trust between trading 
partners. 
The remaining elements of the conceptual framework that are not addressed through the 
hypothesis, i.e. the performance indicators, are discussed later in section 3.7 through the insights 
from the interviews. 
3.2 Survey design and Implementation  
3.2.1 Study area 
Data collection took place in Northern Ethiopia specifically in the Tigray region of the Lailay 
Maychew woreda in Aksum. Figure 3.1 depicts the location of Aksum in a map. The region was 
selected based on the higher production of Chickpea in the Tigray region. Chickpea farmers were 
selected from four woredas, namely Dura, Hatsebo, Mayweyni and Hadush Adi based on a list 
obtained from the woreda agriculture office. The list was based on the amount of chickpea 
production and the proximity to the woreda office. Farmers from the first four woredas on the list 
participated in the study.  A total of 148 chickpea farmers were part of study. Retailers, 
wholesalers and small-scale chickpea processors were also included in the study and were 
randomly selected from the nearest markets found in Aksum, the capital city of the regional 
state, Mekelle and the capital city of the country, Addis Ababa. Interviews with key informants 
in the RUF supply chain included six food processing companies, 3 of which produced some 
form of relief food products, 5 RUFS buyers (government and NGOs) and four hospitals that 
have patients that use these products. The primary data was collected using structured 
questionnaires, structured interviews and focus group discussion administered by trained 
enumerators and the author in December 2017 and January 20182. Mekelle University assisted in 
data collection by providing experienced research assistants, providing support letter to 
                                                          
2 The study received ethics approval from the University of Saskatchewan behavioural research 
ethics board (BEH number 17-374) on November 28 2017. 
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administrators of the research site and by identifying chickpea growing regions. The farmer 
survey included question regarding the socio-economic characteristic of households, chickpea 
production and marketing questions. The survey had questions that inform the relationship 
farmers have with their trading partners as well as the level of trust and information sharing 
between trading partners. It also had a section that gathered further information regarding the 
transaction costs involved in producing, selling and storing their crops. Farmers’ participation in 
formal\informal institutions was also included in the survey. The survey instruments used are 
found in Appendix C. There are a number of challenges in data collection in Ethiopia including 
the difficulty of getting accurate data due to participant’s bias towards responding in a way they 
think will please the researcher and fear of retribution if they say something negative against the 
government or senior administrators in their region. To minimize these challenges the 
respondents were assured in the informed consent information that their responses will not be 
shared with anyone and the personally identifying information page will be detached and kept 
separate from the information they provide. The use of research assistants from Mekelle 
University (instead of local research assistants from the woreda) who have a lower chance of 
personally knowing the respondents or the local administrators have lowered the above bias for 
the case of this study. In addition, the affiliation with Mekelle University who the participants 
are likely to see as an independent institution which uses data only for research is believed to 
have further reduced the bias. The use of qualitative data obtained from the focus group 
discussions and informal chats have given useful perspective and a better understanding of the 
data obtained from the surveys.  
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Figure 3.1 Map showing the location of Aksum 
 
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7505957.stm  
The study areas were identified from a list provided by the region’s Agriculture and rural 
development office.  Contacts of agricultural extension workers for each kebele were also 
provided from the same office. The farmers that participated were identified with the help of 
these agriculture extension workers and community leaders. The agriculture extension workers 
asked chickpea farmers to come to a certain location for participation in a research study. The 
farmers were selected based on whether or not they produced chickpea. Only farmers who had 
previously grown chickpea were included in the survey, as the region was implementing a new 
program where breeder seed was being multiplied through a contract agreement with farmers and 
a number of farmers who had not grown chickpea previously were involved in these programs. 
These farmers were not included in the study as they have not yet harvested chickpea. 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
3.3.1 Background and socioeconomic characteristics    
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the farmer survey sample population. The majority 
of the farmer survey participants are men (78%) and most households are male headed (88 
percent). Mean household size was seven.  The mean age of the participants is 45 years. About 
80 percent of the participants had some formal education while 13 percent had some post-
primary education, which is higher than the national adult literacy rate which is 39 percent 
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(UNSECO, 2007). Average household income was 1654 Birr per month with 68.3% of 
households earning less than or equal to 2000 Birr per month (Figure 3.2).  Most households own 
mobile phones (79%) and a radio (56%). Mobile coverage is higher than the average for the 
country’s population which was around 50% in 2016 (Statista, 2018). Figure 3.3 shows 
household’s ownership of other equipment such as radio and transportation vehicles. Twenty one 
percent of the respondents were tenant farmers who did not own the land they cultivated but 
rented it from other landowners (family, relatives or any community member) who could not 
farm their lands. Most times the agreement is to either share the harvest in half or some agreed 
percentage. Off-farm activity was limited, with 58% of farmers not doing any activity besides 
farming. The most common off-farm activity is daily labour where 14% of respondents 
participated. 
 
Figure 3.2 Household income level per month (n= 142) 
 
Source: Survey data from chickpea farmers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
<1000Bir 1000-2000Birr 2000-3000Birr >3000Birr
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
47 
 
Table 3.1. Background characteristics of farmer survey sample  
Background characteristics  Mean (± SD) 
N=148 
 Age 45.3 (13.5) 
Household size 7 (2.20) 
Gender (%)  
Male 78.4 
Female 21.6 
Household head (%) n=147  
   Male 87.8 
   Female  10.9 
    Parents 1.4 
Formal education (%)  
      No formal education 19.6 
      Primary  67.5 
      Post primary 12.9 
Usual occupation (%) 
      Farmer 78.4 
      Tenant farmer  20.9 
Off-farm employment (%)  
      None  57.5 
      Daily laborer 
      Civil servant 
13.6 
5.4 
      Security guard 6.8 
      Builder(construction) 
      Trading 
3.4 
2.1 
      Spiritual activity 2.7 
      Tenant farming 
      Own Business 
4.8 
1.4 
 
Figure 3.3 Farmer survey participant ownership of equipment (n=147) 
 
Source: Survey data from chickpea farmers 
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3.3.2 Agricultural and chickpea production statistics  
As shown in table 3.2, about 76% of households owned the land they cultivated. The average 
size of land farmed and owned was 1.25 hectares, the median was 1.125 hectares and the range 
was 0.125 to 3.5 hectares. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of cultivated land area across the 
survey participants. The agriculture office’s statement of yield (1200kg/hectare) of the most 
commonly grown chickpea varieties is higher than the one reported by the households in the 
survey, which was 678.46kg/hectare on average.  Sixty percent of survey participants reported a 
yield lower than 600kg/hectare, about 17% reported a yield above 1000kg/hectare and 23% 
reported a yield between 600 and 1000kg/hectare.  
 Figure 3.4 Farmer survey participant area cultivated (n=147)  
 
Source: Survey data from chickpea farmers 
The most common type of chickpea variety grown is the Desi variety. About 14% of the survey 
participants had traded chickpea for more than ten years, 19.5% had traded chickpea from six to 
ten years while 67% had traded chickpea for less than five years. Forty nine percent of 
participants use fertiliser, pesticide and improved seed on their farms while 46.66% use 
fertilizers and pesticide. These inputs were mostly obtained from the local government office (for 
77% of households).  About six percent of household bought their inputs directly form the 
market.  
All households had access to agriculture extension workers who can provide training on how to 
cultivate chickpea and use fertilizer, improved seed and pesticide, information about 
demand/price of chickpea, and information about services available to farmers. Households who 
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obtained their price information from agriculture extension workers were more likely to engage 
in microfinance and breeder seed contractual agreements (regression results attached in 
Appendix A). Of the total 148 survey participants, 110 households had no written agreement 
with respect to chickpea transaction. The remaining households had written agreements 
regarding credit from microfinance institutions. Seven households have agreements with the 
government/farmer unions to take a special type of seed, plant it on their land and then sell the 
harvest to the government/union at a good price. Twenty three households had written 
agreements about price, quantity, quality and/or delivery time of chickpea. 
Surplus chickpea is stored inside the house by 92% of households. Only about 5% had a separate 
storage facility and 2% did not have any surplus to store. The most common reason for storing 
surplus is for the purpose of both home consumption and seed (44%) while 30% store it just for 
home consumption. Twenty percent of households store chickpea, along with other reasons, to 
sell when prices go up. The sole reason for storing surplus was to sell when price goes up only 
for 3.4 % of households. 
Table 3.2 Household land ownership and chickpea production 
  Background characteristics (n =148) Percent (%) 
Ownership of cultivation land 
 
    Own land  76.2% 
    Own land and tenant land 16.4% 
    Relative/family land 3.4% 
    Tenant land 2% 
HH cultivated land size  
   ≤ 0.5 hectare  17% 
   0.6-1.0 hectare    6.8% 
   1.01-2.0 hectares  59.9% 
   > 2.0 hectares 16.3% 
Amount of harvested chickpea  
       Low(<250kg) 48.6% 
       Average(250-500kg)                    36.5%    
      Moderately high (500-750kg) 6.1% 
        High(>750kg) 8.8% 
Yield (%)   
   Low (<600/Hec.) 60% 
   Average (600-1000kg/Hec.) 22.8% 
   High (>1000kg/Hec) 17.2% 
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The common informal institutions were Iddir and Ikkub. Iddir is the most common with 54.1 
percent being a member. It is a type of social capital that people use during funerals. Members 
contribute a small amount monthly and they benefit from the provision of labour and materials 
ranging from tents to cooking and eating utensils and some cash following the death of a family 
member. Funeral ceremonies are events that require a significant expense in Ethiopia thus 
individuals use this as an insurance. It is rarely used for agricultural related activities. About 35 
percent of households are members of an Ikkub. Ikkub is a form of informal credit institution 
where members contribute cash periodically and a lottery system is used to give the collective 
sum to each member in each round.  The length of the round is based on agreement among 
members and it can be either weekly, biweekly, monthly or any agreed length of time. About 47 
percent of households used the money obtained from Ikkub to buy seeds, fertilizer or pesticide. 
Of these households, about 50 percent used money from Ikkub only occasionally for costs 
related with chickpea production and marketing.  
Cooperatives and farmers associations are also common in this region, with almost 60 percent of 
surveyed households being members. Different types of cooperatives exist in the region 
including multipurpose coops, irrigation, saving and credit, dairy, and livestock cooperatives etc. 
This study did not differentiate between the different types of cooperatives. Agricultural output 
marketing through these cooperatives or farmers associations are very low, in particular for 
chickpea, instead they are mostly used for input purchases and for marketing of Teff. Only 17.8 
percent of the participants sold their chickpea output to cooperatives or government agencies. 
This finding is in line with other studies in the region that found the use of cooperatives mostly 
for agricultural input purchasing (Atsbaha, 2008).  Most households preferred selling directly to 
consumers (68 percent) as they stated it offered the highest price for their chickpea. Households 
also sold chickpea through wholesalers (18 percent) and retailers (seven percent). Figure 3.5 
describes the marketing channels used by survey participants for chickpea. The major deciding 
element in choosing a marketing channel was the difference in price offered for 40% of 
participants.  
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Figure 3.5. Marketing channel used for chickpea  
 
Source: Survey data from chickpea farmers 
On average it took farmers about an hour and half to reach the market where they sold chickpea. 
Forty-two percent travelled on donkey while 26 percent went by foot, 15 percent used both foot 
and donkey. Only five percent of households used public transport (cars or three wheel vehicles). 
Most households are able to sell their chickpeas at the first day of taking it to the market as 66% 
of households reported that their output has never been returned from the market or remained 
unsold. For the remaining households that sometimes do not sell their chickpea during the first or 
subsequent visit to the market, the leading reason is a low price offered for their chickpea 
followed by low demand for the product.   
3.4 Research methodology and the structural equation model (SEM) 
Figure 3.6 highlights in red the part of the conceptual framework that is examined using the 
structural equation model. The remaining parts of the conceptual framework are addressed later 
with qualitative analysis from the interviews with different stakeholders. 
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Figure 3.6 The section of the conceptual framework examined by the SEM 
 
 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a statistical method that generalizes and extends upon  
regression, path analysis and factor analysis to test hypothesized theoretical models (Schumacker 
& Lomax, 2010). It is very flexible in terms of allowing the creation of latent variables that are 
unobservable, allowing multiple dependent variables, and an ability to model errors in 
measurement by testing if the measurement of a construct is consistent with empirical data 
(Chin, 1998). Structural equation modeling has two components, the measurement model and the 
structural model. The measurement model is where the unobserved latent variables are specified 
based on the covariance of the observable indicator variables that are uniquely associated with 
them (Hoyle, 1995). The measurement model is the part where a confirmatory factor analysis, 
which tests the relationship between the observed variables and the latent variables, is carried 
out. The structural model is where the hypothesized relationship between latent variables, and 
between latent variables and other observable variables that are not indicators of the latent 
variables, is tested (Hoyle, 1995). The measurement model and the structural model together 
form the structural equation model (SEM).  
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The SEM requires certain assumptions in order to have reliable estimates and accurate test 
statistics. The most commonly used estimation methods in SEM are Maximum Likelihood and 
Generalized Least Squares which require that variables be continuous and multivariate normally 
distributed (Andreassen, Lorentzen, & Olsson, 2006). However, alternative procedures have 
been developed to carry out SEM with non-normally distributed data. The asymptotic 
distribution-free (ADF) estimation method can be used with non-normally distributed data as the 
test statistics for model fit are robust to the shape of distribution (Hu & Bentler, 1998). The 
variables used in this model are mostly categorical and the data is not normally distributed, 
therefore, the ADF estimation method is used. Table 3.3 gives a description of the variables used 
in the SEM model. 
How well the estimated model fits the data can be tested with a number of indices in SEM 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). The most widely used measures of fit include the Chi-squared 
divided by the degrees of freedom, where a value less than or equal to two shows a good fit and 
values less than or equal to five show acceptable fit. Also, the Comparative fit index (CFI), 
Tucker_Lewis index (TLI) and the Goodness-of-fit index (GFI) that have values close to 0.9 or 
0.95 show a good fit. For the Root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), values from 
0.05 to 0.08 show a good model fit. 
Table 3.3 Description of the variables used in the model 
Variables used in the SEM  
Variable name Variable 
code 
Variable description Variable 
measurement 
Mean(SD)/pro
portion  
Membership in 
institutions 
Member Whether a farmer is a 
member of one of the 
following: Iddir, 
Ikkub, cooperative or 
farmers association, 
microfinance or 
political party  
0 if not member 
1 if member 
Idir (54%), 
Ikkub (35%), 
Coop/farmers 
assoc (60%), 
Microfinance 
(43%), 
Political (9%)  
Trust  
Reputation Reputation 
My major trading 
partner has a good 
reputation 
1-5 Likert-scaled 
questions (Strongly 
disagree – Strongly 
agree) 
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Close 
relationship  
CloseRship I have a close 
relationship with my 
major /most 
important trading 
partner 
1-5 Likert-scaled 
questions (Strongly 
disagree – Strongly 
agree) 
 
Confidence in 
trading partner 
Confidence 
I have confidence in 
my major trading 
partner 
1-5 Likert-scaled 
questions (Strongly 
disagree – Strongly 
agree) 
 
Information sharing  
Best interest in 
dealings 
Bestinterest My major/most 
important trading 
partner considers my 
best interests in our 
dealings 
1-5 Likert-scaled 
questions (Strongly 
disagree – Strongly 
agree) 
 
Partner shares 
information  
PartnershrIn
fo 
My  major/most 
important trading 
partner shares useful 
information with me 
1-5 Likert-scaled 
questions (Strongly 
disagree – Strongly 
agree) 
 
Risk sharing Sharerisk My  major/most 
important trading 
partner is willing to 
share risk with me 
1-5 Likert-scaled 
questions (Strongly 
disagree – Strongly 
agree) 
 
Believe the 
information  
BelieveInfo I believe the 
information my 
major/most important  
trading partner 
provides 
1-5 Likert-scaled 
questions (Strongly 
disagree – Strongly 
agree) 
 
Negotiation 
time 
Negoatiatio
ntime 
How long does it 
take to sell a kilo of 
your chickpea, 
average time spent in 
finding and 
negotiating a deal 
Minutes 116.93(140) 
n=148 
Marketed 
surplus 
MktSurplus How much of 
harvested chickpea is 
sold? 
Kilograms 217.47 
(234.33) 
Transportation 
time 
Howfarmkt How far do you 
typically travel to sell 
your chickpea? 
Minutes  91.05 (54.77) 
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Figure 3.7 is the conceptual framework as well as the proposed full SEM that includes all the 
hypotheses to be tested in this model. In Figure 3.7, the items in the rectangular boxes are 
observed variables and the items in oval frames are latent variables. Figure 3.7 includes both the 
measurement and the structural model of the SEM. Membership in an institution depicts 
membership in one of the following institutions: Iddir, Ikkub, cooperative or farmers association, 
microfinance and political party. Five separate models are run for each single institution. A 
detailed discussion of these institutions is found in the descriptive statistics section (Section 
3.3.2) 
Figure 3.7 The proposed full structural equation model 
 
A regression analysis was initially done to examine the relationship between trust, information 
sharing and membership in institutions before the SEM was used. However, the relationships 
outlined in the conceptual framework was better captured through the SEM due to the flexibility 
of the SEM and the nature of the data. The results from the regression analysis are attached in 
Appendix B for further insight and reference.    
 
3.5 Assessment of the measurement model 
This section tests the structural equation model described above. The measures for trust, 
information sharing and satisfaction with major trading partner are calculated from the farmers’ 
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responses to scaled survey questions shown in table 3.4. The measures are mainly adopted from 
Blandon, Henson and Cranfield (2009) and the conceptual framework discussed in section 3.1.  
 
Measures for trust, information sharing and satisfaction are constructed using exploratory factor 
analysis based on the 17 Likert-scaled survey questions included in the survey. A Principal 
component analysis using the Varimax rotation method was applied. Factor loadings above 0.5 
with Eigen values greater than one were used. These variables are later used in the SEM 
measurement model in a confirmatory factor analysis. Table 3.4 also provides the Cronbach’s 
alpha values, which measures the internal consistency or the reliability of the constructs. A 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.9 and above is excellent, values around 0.8 are good while values 
above 0.7 are acceptable\adequate (Kline, 2005). The exploratory factor analysis was carried out 
using IBM SPSS Statistics 24 Software. 
The variables loaded to three different factors except for two questions that did not load to any 
factor. These two measures were dropped from the model. One measure in the factor 
“Satisfaction” which asked a participant’s perception of his trading partner’s confidence in him 
showed a low loading (0.44). In addition, the Cronbach’s alpha value for the factor 
“Satisfaction” was 0.49, which is below the acceptable level at 0.7, therefore, the construct 
“satisfaction” was dropped from further analysis3. The remaining variables and factors had high 
or acceptable loadings and Cronbach’s alpha values. Table 3.5 and Figure 3.8 show the six 
measures that loaded to the construct “Information sharing” and the other five measures that 
loaded to “Trust”4. Figure 3.8 is the measurement model that is also the confirmatory factor 
analysis. The variable in rectangles are the variables that explain the unobserved latent variables 
which are in the oval shapes.   
                                                          
3 The satisfaction variable has failed to be significant even after the questions with lower factor loading were 
dropped from the analysis.  
4 The trust variable is treated as a latent variable with a reflexive model as a formative model did not find any path 
from the latent variable trust to the observed variables. 
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Table 3.4 Trust, Information sharing and satisfaction survey questions 
Constructs (Cronbach’s 
alpha) 
Survey questions Factor 
loadings 
Information sharing 
(α=0.827) 
  
 My major/most important trading partner shares useful 
information with me 
0.733 
 I share useful information with my major trading partner 0.679 
 My major/most important trading partner is willing to share 
risk with me 
0.731 
 My major/most important trading partner has the best offer 
relative to other alternatives 
0.603 
 I believe the information my major/most important trading 
partner provides 
0.622 
 My major/most important trading partner considers my best 
interests in our dealings 
0.572 
Trust questions (α=0.803)   
 My major trading partner has a good reputation 0.832 
 I have confidence in my major trading partner 0.776 
 I have a close relationship with my major /most important 
trading partner 
0.699 
 My major trading partner is honest 0.674 
 My major/most important trading partner treats me fairly and 
equitably. 
0.51 
Satisfaction (α= -0.492)   
 I have good cooperation with my major trading partner. 
he(she) is cooperative 
.778 
 My major trading partner always keeps his (her) promises   0.64 
 
My major/most important trading partner has confidence in me 
0.44 
 
Items that didn’t load to any 
factors 
 
 
 I have a number of conflicts with my major/most important 
trading partner. 
-0.755 
 My major/most important trading partner provides financial 
assistance when I need it 
0.511 
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Figure 3.8. The measurement model 
 
Based on results obtained from the explanatory factor analysis a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) was carried out on the measurement model (figure 3.8). Two measures from each factor 
(trust and information sharing) were further dropped due to poor factor loadings. Partner’s fair 
and equitable treatment and trading partner being honest were the two items dropped from the 
trust construct in the measurement model due to poor loadings. A factor loading should be above 
0.5 to be acceptable or above 0.7 to be a good fit to the data. Trading partner having the best 
offer was dropped from the information sharing construct due to poor factor loading. The item 
measuring a participant’s willingness to share information with a partner was dropped from the 
model due to high correlation with a similar item measuring a trading partner’s willingness to 
share information with the participant. Figure 3.8 also shows that reputation of a trading partner, 
close relationship with trading partner and confidence in trading partner are the measures of the 
Trust construct. Information sharing with a trading partner is measured by the variables: a 
partner having the best interest of his other trading partner, a partner sharing information, a 
partner sharing risk and believing information shared by a trade partner. Therefore, the trust and 
information sharing variables enter the analysis as latent variables that are inferred from the 
variables that had high loadings in each construct. The standardized factor loadings and the 
standardized variance of the error term are displayed in figure 3.8 which are also reported in 
table 3.5.   
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Table 3.5 shows the results of the CFA, including the factor loadings and error terms associated 
with the measurement model. The measurement model showed a good overall model fit with 
χ2/df=1.25 (p>chi2=0.23), RMSEA=0.04, CFI=0.978, TLI=0.965, SRMR=0.06. The factor 
loadings were also above the minimum required level.  
Table 3.5. Results of the measurement model 
The measurement model 
  Standardized 
loadings 
Error term/ 
Std.variance 
Trust 
 Reputation 0.83 0.32 
 Close relationship 0.8 0.36 
 Confidence 0.74 0.45 
Information sharing 
 Best Interest 0.8 0.35 
 Partner share info 0.76 0.43 
 Share risk 0.74 0.46 
 Believe information 0.67 0.55 
 
3.6 Hypothesis testing and model results   
Based on the constructs that were established in the earlier section, i.e. trust and information 
sharing, this section discuss how these constructs are affected by membership in informal/formal 
institutions. How trust and information sharing relate with each other and how they affect 
transaction costs is also tested. The path analysis of the structural equation model is performed. 
The hypotheses restated below are the paths tested in the structural equation model. The trust and 
information sharing variables enter the SEM as latent variables which are inferred from the 
variables obtained from the exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. Five separate structural 
equation models are run based on the five institutions identified. Each of the five models 
represent a different institution that has different role/purpose, organization, level of participation 
and structure. The frequency of meetings, the reason for meetings and the frequency of use of 
these institutions also vary. The entire path analysis is run for each model separately. Each of the 
five separate models are based on a common single trust and information sharing question. 
Therefore, the models show the moderation effect of the path analysis. The institutions are Iddir, 
Ikkub, cooperatives, microfinance and political organization. Iddir and Ikkub are treated as the 
informal institutions while cooperatives, microfinance and political party are treated as formal 
institutions. These institutions moderate the relationship between the trust and information 
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variables and the transaction cost measures. The hypotheses are tested for each model and the 
results from the structural equation modeling (SEM) show that most of the hypothesized 
relations are supported by the data. Table 3.6 summarizes the results from the models while table 
3.7 summarizes how the hypothesis relate with the results of the model.  
The first hypothesis, which states H1: An increase in trust between trading partners is associated 
with a reduction in transaction costs related with chickpea marketing has support from the 
model except for transportation time, as can be seen in Table 3.6. The variables that measure 
transaction costs in the models are negotiation time, marketed surplus and transportation time. 
The results indicate trust between trading partners increased marketed surplus and reduces time 
spent negotiation price and/or quality for the four institutions/models. All the 4 models except 
the political party model (model 5) support this hypothesis that trust between trading partners 
increases marketed surplus and reduces negotiation time involved in chickpea marketing. Model 
5 does not support the hypothesis that trust reduces negotiation time as the path estimate between 
trust and negotiation time is not significant, as shown in Table 3.6.  The transportation time spent 
in chickpea marketing is also not significantly affected by trust between partners for model 2 and 
3 (Iddir and Coop). The relationship (between trust and transportation time) is negative for the 
other models (Ikkub, microfinance and political party).  
The second hypothesis which states an increase in information sharing between trading partners 
is associated with an increase in trust between trading partners is supported by all five models 
as expected in accordance with theory and other studies that found a positive relationship 
between trust and information sharing where exchange of information improved the level of trust 
by lowering uncertainty (Fafchamps & Minten, 2002; Kwon and Suh, 2004). 
The third hypothesis which states membership in informal institutions is associated with an 
increase in information sharing between trading partners has a mixed result. While it is true for 
Model 1(Ikkub) but there is no significant relationship between membership in Model 2 (Iddir) 
and information sharing. This could be due to the different nature of the institutions. Ikkub is 
strongly based on trust as it deals with money and thus financial trust and members interact 
among each other more often due to few number of members at a time and also the need to 
ensure there is no default by members. Iddir is a type of community insurance where a large 
group of people come together during a time of need. Therefore, the size of membership and the 
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context of meeting (usually during funerals) might lower the level of information sharing going 
on regarding chickpea. In addition, the formation of Ikkub requires disclosure of why the fund is 
needed by the person who is initiating the organization or any other person in the group who asks 
for priority in obtaining the fund. This set up increases the information shared between members. 
In Iddir, there is no need to share any information and the only obligation is the contribution of 
funds and physical presence which does not necessarily lead towards information sharing about 
markets. However, the opportunity that Iddir provides in terms of social gathering might to a 
limited extent promote information sharing though this supposition is not supported by this 
study’s results.   
The fourth hypothesis which states membership in formal institutions is associated with an 
increase in information sharing between trading partners also has mixed results. While 
membership in cooperatives or farmers organizations (Model 3) affects information sharing 
positively. Model 4 (microfinance institutions) fails to be significant and model 5 (political 
institutions) has a negative coefficient. The negative relationship between membership in a 
political party and information sharing regarding chickpea marketing could be due to 
opportunism. Being a member of a ruling political party in a developing country context might 
give members an extra information advantage regarding upcoming policies or government 
programs that benefit farmers. Since these members are themselves farmers who want to benefit 
from exclusive information, information might not freely flow or they might be reluctant to share 
it. 
The fifth hypothesis which states membership in informal institutions is associated with an 
increase in trust between trading partners is supported by the two informal institution models 
(model 1 and model 2). The last hypothesis, which states membership in formal institutions 
positively affects trust between trading partners is not significant for model 4 (microfinance) 
while it is positive as expected for model 3 (Cooperative) and 5 (political institution). 
Membership in microfinance institutions is defined in the data as any credit received from a 
formal or informal credit institution (including from trading partners). The negative relationship 
could be due to the mistrust that is usually associated with microfinance institutions. Most 
microfinance institution users in Ethiopia use the regular banking system to save money but use-  
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Table 3.6 Results from the structural equation model 
Path Estimates( Standardized coefficients) 
 Informal 
institutions 
Formal institutions 
  Model1 
(Ikkub) 
n=51 
Model2 
(Iddir) 
n=80 
Model3 
(Co-op) 
n=88 
Model4 
(Microfin) 
n=64 
Model 5 
(Political) 
n=13 
Trust → Negotiation time 
(H1) 
-0.2*** 
(0.001) 
-0.19*** 
(0.001) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.17** 
(0.039) 
-0.09 
(0.16) 
Trust → Transportation 
time (H1) 
0.21*** 
(0.003) 
0.09 
(0.26) 
0.14    
(0.07) 
0.007* 
(0.09) 
0.15* 
(0.07) 
Trust→ Marketed surplus 
(H1) 
0.3*** 
(0.00) 
0.16*** 
(0.005) 
0.2*** 
(0.00) 
0.2* 
(0.078) 
0.19*** 
(0.008) 
Info Sharing→ Trust (H2) 0.65*** 
(<0.001) 
0.71*** 
(<0.001) 
0.59*** 
(<0.001) 
0.68*** 
(<0.001) 
0.8*** 
(<0.001) 
Membership → Info share 
(H3 and H4)  
0.18** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.72) 
0.26*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.12 
(0.19) 
-0.39*** 
(<0.001) 
Membership →Trust(H5 
and H6) 
0.1* 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.00) 
0.34*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.05 
(0.56) 
0.25*** 
(<0.001) 
   ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
+Values in parenthesis are p-values 
 
microfinances to obtain loans (Mackie, Brown, Smith, & GebreEgziabher, 2015). The corruption 
and inefficiency that exists in many cooperatives strains the trust farmers have in this 
institutions. Microfinance institutions, though playing a significant role in poverty reduction 
(Berhane & Gardebroek, 2011), have yet to build sufficient trust to realize their full potential 
(Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions, 2010). The lack of trust of farmers in 
microfinance institutions in turn can constrain the capacity of the institutions to serve the farmers 
(as farmers are not saving enough) which can lead to further inefficiencies and deterioration of 
trust. The negative relationship observed in the results can thus be due to both the farmers’ lack 
of trust which comes from the inefficiency of the institutions and also the inefficiency of the 
institutions which arises from the lack of sufficient participation from farmers. 
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Table 3.7 Support for hypotheses from the SEM 
Paths Support for Hypothesis 
H1: An increase in trust between trading partners is associated 
with a reduction in transaction cost related with chickpea 
marketing. 
  
Negotiation time Yes, except for Political 
Marketed amount Yes 
Transportation time No 
H2:An increase in information sharing between trading partners is 
associated with an increase in  trust  
Yes 
H3: Membership in informal institutions is associated with an 
increase in information sharing  
Yes for Ikkub, No for 
Iddir 
H4: Membership in formal institutions is associated with an 
increase in information sharing  
Yes, only for 
cooperatives 
H5: Membership in informal institutions is associated with an 
increase in  trust  
Yes 
H6: Membership in formal institutions is associated with an 
increase in trust 
Yes except for 
microfinance 
 
Table 3.8 shows the SEM model has a satisfactory fit with the chi-square to degrees of freedom 
ratio ranging from 1.3 to 1.9. The CFI ranges from 0.93-0.84 which is a little low for Model 1 
and 5. The RMSE ranges between 0.05-0.08 which is a good fit. In general models 2 and 3 had 
the best fit, with model 4 having a good fit, while Model 1 and 5 have low a CFI.  
 
Table 3.8 Model fit indices for the SEM  
 Χ2/df CFI RMSE SRMR 
Model1(Ikkub) 2.03(p=0.00) 0.846 0.084 0.130 
Model2(Iddir) 1.39(p=0.04) 0.931 0.052 0.09 
Model3(Cooperative) 1.47(p=0.03) 0.916 0.057 0.106 
Model4(Microfinance) 1.81(p=0.001) 0.877 0.075 0.116 
Model5(Political) 1.94(p=0.00) 0.842 0.081 0.125 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter developed a series of hypotheses based on the conceptual framework and presented 
the results from qualitative and quantitative analysis of the survey data and interviews. The 
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descriptive statistics gave insights into the socioeconomic characteristic of chickpea farmers in 
Northern Ethiopia and the type and level of chickpea production and marketing. The structural 
equation model examined the relationships stated in the hypotheses. The results indicate 
institutions positively contribute to improved chickpea marketing by improving information 
sharing and trust among trading partners. Therefore, strengthening these institutions or 
encouraging participation could be an efficient way to improve performance of chickpea 
marketing. Existing, informal institutions in developing countries can be as effective as formal 
institutions so effort should be put towards their continuation and improvement. 
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Chapter 4 Insights from the interviews 
The SEM examined the relationships between membership in institutions and social capital as 
well as the relationship between social capital and transaction costs. The interviews with the 
different stakeholders in the supply chain for RUF examine the alignment of the supply chain 
with key performance indicators and the key success factors. The portion of the conceptual 
framework that is addressed by the insights from the interviews is highlighted in figure 4.1. In 
general, based on the conceptual framework and the literature which measures the success of 
humanitarian supply chains (Table 2.1), the supply of RUTF/RUSF is relatively efficient. 
Standardization of products, quality management, flexibility, availability of product, and speed 
of product delivery are the main measures of success discussed in the section below. The results 
from the quantitative analysis in chapter three can be used by food processing companies that 
have close dealings with chickpea farmers, wholesalers and other input suppliers. These 
companies can utilize the informal institutions that are predominant in the dealings of small-
holder farmer, retailer, and wholesalers to reduce the transaction costs that arise from poor 
supply chains. The application of the results from the farmer survey to the other supply chain 
actors is further discussed in the insights from food processing companies in section 4.3.    
Figure 4.1 The section of the conceptual framework examined by the interviews  
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4.1 Insight from the health facilities  
Four health facilities located in the capital Addis Ababa were included in the interviews.  Of 
these, two were large general hospitals and two were smaller health facilities.  The head of the 
facility’s pharmacy and\or head of the pharmacy store were interviewed. The interview guide is 
attached in part 4 of Appendix C. The interview guide include questions regarding the source of 
funds and supply for RUF, the amount of time required to obtain RUF supplies, the level of 
discrepancy between demand and supply of RUF, the challenges\issues in the supply of RUF 
and, the level of acceptability of the products by beneficiaries. The pharmacy or the pharmacy 
store is the department that manages Ready-to–use food products in all facilities and they are 
mostly given to children and in some facilities to HIV patients (previously to TB patients as well 
but not anymore). Both the ready to use therapeutic food (RUTF) and the ready to use 
supplementary food (RUSF) are given at all facilities. The facilities get their supply of RUFs 
from the Pharmaceuticals Fund and Supply Agency (PFSA). The PFSA is a federal government 
institution established in 2007 with the aim of facilitating the uninterrupted supply of quality 
assured and affordable pharmaceuticals to public health institutions in a sustainable process.  It 
has a central warehouse in its headquarters in Addis Ababa and branch offices in 16 
locations/regions throughout Ethiopia. RUF is supplied and delivered free of charge to the 
facilities along with other “program drugs” that are sponsored. The health facilities have a format 
for reporting use of RUFs every two months which serves as the basis for the supply they will 
get for the next two months. They place orders to the PFSA based on the amount they have used 
in the previous two months. It is a consumption based supply. The quantity of RUF received 
depends on the facility’s previous consumption as well as the available stock at PFSA. The 
quantity demanded depends on the size of the health facility and the type of people who receive 
them (HIV patients or/and children) and it ranges from 20-150 cartons (two months’ supply).  
One carton contains 150 sachets. The RUFs are given based on weight of the patients who can 
either be hospitalized or in the outpatient department. 
In general, the health facilities receive the quantity they requested but there have been some 
instances where demand was not met. Two of the facilities stated that they overstate their 
demand knowing the PFSA is going to undersupply and because some outpatient users need to 
take more than a two month’s supply of RUTF/RUSF.  They order what they call the “Maximum 
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stock”. Orders are placed/reported a little above what is exactly needed. This has enabled them to 
meet extra demands. 
Some patients that needed RUF have not been able to obtain them due to shortages of RUF at the 
health facility. In one facility as many as 10 people have failed to receive them in the prior six 
months. These are usually adults with low body weight due to HIV/AIDS. It is the ready to use 
therapeutic food that is usually in shortage.  Interviewees indicated that no RUF has ever expired 
while in stock in any of the facilities. It takes 15-20 days, on average, for the RUF to arrive at the 
health facilities after an order/report has been sent. Sometimes it arrives earlier and sometimes it 
is late but this has not seriously affected the smooth running of the facilities and it mostly arrives 
on time. Emergency orders are not common but if they happen the PFSA does not deliver them. 
The health facility would have to send personnel to go and process the request. It takes 2-3 days 
to get emergency supplies. However, all these facilities are located in Addis Ababa where the 
central PFSA office is located and proximity to the headquarters might expedite the process. 
Health facilities in other regions far from the central warehouse in Addis Ababa might face 
challenges regarding emergency supply even though PFSA has branches in these regions. Figure 
4.2 describes the product flow of RUF in Ethiopia. 
Figure 4.2 Product flow of RUF in Ethiopia 
 
Source: Interviews with stakeholders 
The level of beneficiary involvement is limited as recipients complain about the RUFs with 
regards to taste (new users), being too salty, causing nausea and acne. Some patients had to stop 
taking them due to nausea while others get used to the taste after repeated use. But no statistical 
data exists in regards to actual number of these cases. Recipients selling their supply of RUF is 
another issue in these health posts. This is usually a problem for recipients in the HIV unit and 
not children as parents value their children’s health and tend to give it to them as recommended. 
Recipients graduate from the RUF foods after six months and if no change in weight is observed 
the provision is stopped but until this is detected interviewees indicated that most users/recipients 
68 
 
sell the supply of RUF they receive.  Both RUTF and RUSF can be found in retail shops for sale. 
The interviewees believe that it is RUF recipients who do not like the taste that sell it instead of 
consuming it. The lack of synchronized system in the health facilities to identify users is also a 
problem because users have been found to register in multiple health facilities for the RUFs and 
make a business of selling the product to retailers.  
In addition to the challenges of recipients selling the product and lack of synchronized supply 
system, not having enough supply to meet demand is one of the major challenges the health 
facilities report. Users of the products have increased and existing users want more than what is 
necessary (want to use it as regular food instead of as supplementary). Due to shortage of the 
product only severely affected children are prioritized and TB patients who previously used this 
products no longer receive them. Other than the above mentioned challenges the supply of RUTF 
and RUSF to hospitals is relatively efficient. 
4.2 Insights from RUF buyers 
Three major buyers and two distribution agents of RUF were interviewed including 
representatives from the World Food Program (WFP), United Nations International Children's 
Fund (UNICEF), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Ethiopian 
Ministry of Health (MOH) and PFSA. The latter two are the major administrator/managers and   
distributors of RUF in Ethiopia though there is a parallel distribution channel used by UNICEF 
and other small local NGOs. There are NGOs and humanitarian organization like Save the 
Children International, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF 
Somalia, Medicine San Frontier and local NGOs which buy RUTF. The insights discussed in this 
section are obtained only from the three major buyers and two distributors. The interview guide 
is attached in part five of appendix C. It included questions regarding the supplier of RUF, the 
lead time from order to delivery, the use of contractual agreements with manufacturers, quality 
requirements and the transportation and distribution of RUFs.  
The RUTF in Ethiopia is obtained from either local or international sources. There is currently 
one local supplier/manufacturer and two major international suppliers. The local supplier is 
Hilina Enriched Foods while the international suppliers are Nutriset (France) and Edesia (USA). 
The majority of the RUTF is obtained from international (offshore) suppliers due to the limited 
capacity of the local manufacturers. In some organizations in certain years there was no local 
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procurement and all procurement was international. For instance, all the supply obtained by 
PFSA for the current year came from offshore, and WFP made 100% of its RUF purchase from 
international sources in the years 2013, 2016 and 2017.  When there is local procurement it is 
still 20-30% of the total procurement. Local procurement is particularly important when the 
international supply is delayed or cannot arrive in a timely manner during emergencies due to 
long lead times.  
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the major funder for both 
the purchase and distribution of the supply that goes through the government body of PFSA. It is 
only recently (one year) that this supply has been managed by the field office in Ethiopia. 
Previous procurements have been done by the Head office abroad and the local office only had 
the role of follow up. The supply of USAID is managed through the Global supply chain 
management system which has an agent (Chemonics International) which manages the supply in 
Ethiopia. Figure 4.3 describes the funding flow of RUF purchases. 
 
Figure 4.3 Funding flow of RUF in Ethiopia 
 
Source: Interviews with stakeholders 
Interviewees reported that the price of the local RUTF is about 20% more expensive than 
offshore RUTF. The offshore price varies based on exchange rate but it is on average 43 dollars 
per carton. When transport cost is added to the international product it becomes around 48-50 
dollars per carton which is still lower than the local price. This has limited the cost efficiency 
aspect of the supply chain as the price of local RUF is not competitive due to a number of factors 
discussed in section 4.3 below.  
International procurement takes on average 3 months from order to delivery. International 
supplies mostly arrive through ocean shipments which take from 2-3 months. The local 
procurement takes as much time as the international due to vendor and production lead times, 
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limited capacity, and raw material shortage. Producers do not keep stocks due to unpredictable 
and variable demand for RUF and they only start production when requests for the product is 
made. Since some of the inputs they use are imported it takes time to process their letter of credit 
and obtain their inputs. Difficulty of obtaining foreign currency is another major delay as 
Ethiopia has been experiencing a foreign currency shortage in the last few years, with the 
situation getting worse recently. Some industries that are highly dependent on imported inputs 
are producing below capacity while others have been forced to suspend production (Capital, 
2018). However, some industries get preferential treatment in obtaining foreign currency or any 
credit based on the government initiative to promote economic growth. These industries include 
manufacturing industries and among these, manufacturers that process agricultural products get 
priority. In addition, industries that earn foreign exchange are high priority in terms of getting 
government support. Hilina foods meets all this criteria so even though it is affected by these 
issues it has managed to deliver without significant delays.  
In addition to unpredictable demand and foreign currency shortage, national shortage of local 
raw materials has further lengthened the lead time to three months. RUF buyers have mentioned 
that there were huge improvements regarding shorter delivery times for local procurement before 
the country started experiencing a raw materials shortage. For instance, it was hard to obtain 
sugar in the country. Consumers had to show residency cards and later ration cards to purchase 
sugar from shops. Other inputs like crops (including chickpea and peanuts) are abundantly 
available only during peak/harvest season. In other seasons they are either unavailable or are 
very expensive. In some instances, producers have been forced to import these raw materials. A 
recent nationwide shortage of peanuts, which are the main ingredients in the RUF’s produced has 
also been a major challenge. Lack of raw material stock due to uncertainty of the long-term or 
continued demand for the end-product further exacerbate the problem. Hilina foods has been/is 
undergoing production plant maintenance and upgrades which took a long time and which led to 
a longer lead time and insufficient provision of the demanded product.  
The shortest lead time so far mentioned by the interviewees is 6 weeks which is also the usually 
promised time frame for delivery. However, there has been variance in delivery ranging from 2 
weeks to 6 weeks due to unforeseen and uncontrollable circumstances.  
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Most of the procurement contracts signed with RUF food processors are long term agreements. 
USAID currently has an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) agreement with Hilina 
Foods and Edesia while dealings with Nutriset are still on-going.  An IDIQ contract is a contract 
commonly used for on-call service and where an indefinite quantity of supply is required.  
USAID’S contract is a purchase order which sets a range to the price of the RUF (ceiling price) 
and the manufacturer’s price quotes are made within that range. It also specifies delivery time 
and price and has clauses to deal with default or contract breach in case they occur. UNICEF and 
WFP have a long term agreement (LTA) contract with their suppliers. UNICEF Ethiopia has a 
two year LTA with the local producer. For instance, 2018’s target quantity is 21,000 cartons 
from local procurement. However, purchase orders are issued until the target quantity is met. 
Similar LTA arrangements are made with international suppliers and offshore procurements are 
managed by the UNICEF headquarters office in Copenhagen which acts based on the 
request/need of the local office. UNICEF Ethiopia also receives in-kind donations of about 
40,850 cartons from USAID (which is bought from MANA (Mother Administered Nutritive 
Aid). WFP has not established a long term supplier agreement with the local supplier though 
there is the potential for one in the future. It has a LTA with the international supplier while it 
uses tenders for the local procurement. Tenders are issued which aim to obtain the best offers 
among offers from different competing potential suppliers. Serious violation of contract terms 
have not occurred with all three buyers though lead times have been extended when unforeseen 
circumstances occur and clauses for penalties exist in case of default.  
Emergency orders for Ethiopia had not been handled by most of the personnel interviewed. But 
emergency procurements are usually made from international suppliers as the local supplier has 
limited capacity. International emergency procurement is usually transported by air. However, 
Hilina foods has been able to deliver more than 20,000 of RUTF to the UNICEF Somalia office 
during an emergency procurement that occurred in 2017 due to drought in Somalia. This 
availability of urgent RUTF supply from neighboring Ethiopia was a significant contribution as 
using the traditional delivery method from ports to towns located along the Ethiopian border had 
security issues (UNICEF, 2017). The supply was procured from Ethiopia and delivered by truck 
from Addis Ababa to the border towns. Hilina foods has also been able to source other WFP 
operations it the East African region.  
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Regarding quality assurance of the products, all buyers have departments and third party 
organizations that do quality assurance inspection for all product bought by their offices. 
Manufacturers must comply with international standards like the Codex Alimentarius which are 
the internationally recognized standards and guidelines for food production and safety. 
Compliance to this standard is verified by physical factory audit. Physical factory audits are also 
done to inspect if manufacturers met the ISO 22000:2005 “Food Safety Management Systems- 
Requirements for any organization in the food chain5”. Any other international and national food 
specific standards, including the WFP food product specification and Nutriset’s (which has given 
a franchise to Hilina Foods) are also verified via physical factory audit and sample laboratory 
testing. Cost for the testing are paid by the buyers. For the RUTF product quality inspection is 
done for every batch of production. Samples are taken from every batch and tested for meeting 
quality standards and testing for salmonella, aflatoxin etc. Quality requirements are strict and 
samples have been rejected from local producers due to failure to meet these specifications.  
Other Specialized Nutritious Foods (SNF) like the corn soya6 blend (super cereals) currently 
have no Ethiopian manufacturers due to the failure of the food processing companies to 
continuously meet the food quality and safety standards. Prior to 2014 ten Ethiopian 
manufacturing lines were set up by humanitarian agencies and the Ethiopian government to 
supply specialized nutritious foods. As of 2014, four manufacturer were compliant to food 
quality and safety standard to carry out production. However, follow up audits had found 
deviation from the food quality and safety requirements which has forced buyers to fully rely on 
international suppliers. 
The Ethiopian Food, Medicine and Health Care Administration and Authority (FMHACA), 
formerly known as the Drug Administration and Control Authority, checks the quality of all 
imported and local RUFs. USAID/SIAPS have provided support for the institution in terms of 
strengthening its capacity to regulate the distribution of counterfeit products and monitor 
complains to safety and quality standards (USAID/SIPPS, 2014). None of the buyers/distributors 
                                                          
5 This has been updated to ISO 22000:2018. It is a document that “specifies requirements for a food safety 
management system where an organization in the food chain needs to demonstrate its ability to control food safety 
hazards in order to ensure that food is safe at the time of human consumption”(ISO, 2005).  
 
6 Corn-soya blend is a partially precooked flour where users have to further prepare it by adding water and boiling it. 
It is not classified as a Ready-to-Use food product.  
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interviewed reported major quality standard violations though damages like packaging bursting 
open and spillage happen during transport and storage. There is no data on how much and how 
often this occurs. 
The distribution channels are effective and short, though there are parallel distribution channels 
that supply chain personnel say can reduce efficiency. The Ethiopian Ministry of Health (MOH) 
along with humanitarian organization and other stakeholders forms a technical working group to 
do quantification of demand/forecast and distribution plan for RUFs. Annual demand is 
forecasted every quarter (3 months) for each region and based on this forecast a distribution plan 
is prepared and the product is distributed to all the regions one month before the quarter starts.  
The MOH does not directly purchase RUFs. Hospitals and health posts throughout the country 
send their requests/demands to their respective regional branches/administrative units’ health 
offices. The regional/administrative unit health offices send this request to the Central PFSA 
office. The office then sends the requested RUF to its branch offices located throughout the 
country. The branch PFSA offices then transport the RUTF to each health facility using their 
own trucks. This process takes on average 15-30 days. Figure 4.4 lays out the information flow 
in the RUF supply chain. USAID covers the procurement, storage and distribution cost of the 
product in this supply chain which is also the major RUF supply chain in the country.  
Figure 4.4 Information flow in the RUF product supply chain in Ethiopia 
 
Source: Interview with stakeholders 
The local manufacturer, Hilina, delivers the product to the buyers (WFP, UNICEF, USAID) 
warehouse. Finished products are delivered free of charge to warehouses in the capital city, 
Addis Ababa. Transportation to regional warehouses and/or program areas is paid for by the 
buyers which use their own trucks or private transporters. UNICEF has three warehouses located 
in Addis Ababa, Gambella and Jijjiga. It has long-term agreements (LTA) with transporters 
(currently two) which are renewed every two year. Additional local transporters exist for 
Gambella and Somalia because they are emergency areas. USAID’s supply, both local and 
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international is delivered to the PFSA warehouse and further distribution is handled by PFSA. 
The supply procured from offshore arrives by third party ocean shipment through the ports of 
Djibouti and Berbera and then through land transport. International shipping and associated 
handling costs are covered by the buyers. Ocean shipment cost is on average 20% of the product 
cost (5USD per carton).  
Local procurement has the following advantages compared to international procurement: it is 
easily accessible; shorter lead time; communication is fast and easier as there is no time zone 
challenge; transportation is easier as it is shorter distances and suppliers deliver to warehouses 
unlike international transportation which takes time as it is ocean shipment and is expensive; 
local supplier are more accommodating of storage problems as they can hold delivery while 
storage space is arranged while if the international shipment arrives it has to be picked up 
immediately. However, international procurement is more reliable in terms of conformity to food 
safety management standards, it is more competitively priced and there is no production capacity 
limit except for expensive transport of large shipments. In terms of local procurement, which is 
one measure of key success factors for humanitarian supply chains, it has been a challenge to 
procure locally due to the capacity limitation of producers and the failure of additional producers 
to meet quality requirements. So even though there is support and priority for local producers a 
significant portion (70-80%) of the supply still comes from international sources.  Based on the 
food quality and sustainability aspects discussed in the conceptual framework and the literature, 
there is still work to be done in improving the capacity of local manufacturers in meeting the 
quality requirements of RUF production.  
There are multiple challenges for buyers within the RUTF supply chain. First, the resources it 
requires for transport and the space it requires for storage is bulky. It also needs a good storage 
facility as it has an appealing element to rodents and some sachets that break apart worsen this 
problem. However, the fact that it can be shipped to program areas directly from containers 
without coming to a storage facility (cross-dock) is an advantage.  The fact that it is bought based 
on demand/forecast reduces the risk of product expiry in stock and lengthy storage time. Second, 
the long lead time for international procurement makes timely arrival during emergencies a 
challenge and will thus require air shipment which is expensive and have implications for the 
cost efficiency of the supply chain. Third, the nature of the product makes it difficult to integrate 
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it into other product supply chains and thus requires its own management which has implications 
for coordination of the supply chain. Fourth, the inadequate number of suppliers limits the 
options and quantity of supply available. Fifth, the heavy reliance on donors and humanitarian 
aid for buying and distributing RUFs makes the supply chain weak in terms of achieving the 
sustainability measure which is one of the key success factors in humanitarian supply chains. 
4.3 Insights from food processing companies  
Five major food processing companies and three small-scale food processing business were 
interviewed to gain insights into the chickpea supply chain and RUF supply chain. The major 
food processing companies included in this study include Hilina Enriched Foods, Kality Foods, 
FAFA Food Complex, NAS foods and Guts Agro Industry. All the companies are located in or 
around the capital Addis Ababa except Guts Agro that has its manufacturing facilities located in 
Bishoftu and Hawassa. From the small food processing companies that participated in this study 
one is located in Addis Ababa, another one in Mekelle and the third one in Wukero, Tigray. All 
the food processing companies are privately owned though FAFA Food complex was state–
owned from its establishment in 1962 until it privatization in 2009. It is now owned by Petram 
Private Limited Company. Hilina Foods is currently the only RUTF and RUSF producer in the 
country7. Chickpea is not regularly used in the products that they produce. However, Hilina have 
developed an RUSF called Denboch which was developed in partnership with the WFP. This 
RUSF was made from chickpea and maize. Chickpea was bought in the spot market through 
middle men who collected chickpea from different farmers, took the risk regarding price and 
quality and were willing to return chickpea that did not meet the quality. However, the plan in 
the future is to source chickpea from farmers associations though there is a fear that buying from 
farmers might not be as flexible as the middle men. For the middle men, price is paid within 30 
days of delivery. But for farmers unions, the money is required right away as they are 
constrained for the availability of cash.  
Kality Food, located in Addis Ababa, is the first industrial food processing enterprise in Ethiopia 
and it processes flour, biscuits and pasta/macaroni which are all wheat based. NAS foods is 
another biscuit food factory and the first sandwich biscuit manufacturer in Ethiopia established 
in 2002. FAFA foods complex is a pioneer food processing company in nutritious food for 
                                                          
7 Guts Agro is not currently producing RUFs but had produced RUSF in 2015 and RUTF in 2012. FAFA food 
complex produces corn soya blend when it is requested by humanitarian agencies or the government.  
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children. The company was initially established in 1962 as a non-profit company to produce a 
balanced diet, nutritious food for children. It was later changed into a for-profit business 
company. It has continued to produce children’s food and also relief food products like corn-
soya blend. It uses chickpea as an alternative for the soya in the corn soya blend and in its 
children foods. Guts agro Industry, established in 2005 is a nutritious food processing company 
that has produced corn-soya blend products for WFP, RUTF (in 2012) and RUSF (in 2015). It 
has sourced its inputs, including chickpea from cooperative unions and commercial farms. It has 
entered into pre-harvest agreements where its pays 30% of the agreed amount before harvest so 
that the farmer unions can address their cash constraints. The remaining 70% is paid immediately 
after delivery. The payments received before harvest helps farmers in the farmers union use the 
appropriate type of seed and fertilizer and hire labor for harvest. Guts Agro’s current products 
include complementary children’s food8, snacks, iodized salt, poultry feed and shiro (chickpea 
flour mixed with species).  
The small-scale food processing companies roast the chickpea to make a common snack called 
kolo or; roast, grind and mix the chickpea with spices to make shiro. All three of the interviewed 
food processors were established in the last 8-10 years. The chickpea they used for their product 
is obtained from the spot market which is usually near to where their business is located. It is 
bought in small quantities every 7-10 days. Price for the chickpea is established by going around 
2-3 wholesalers/retailers and asking and negotiating the price based on physical inspection of 
quality (like dirt level, pest damage and size) or by calling merchants they know over the phone. 
The challenge they face is finding a consistent supply of quality chickpea for their food products. 
Finance for their business is mostly from “dube”. Dube is a system where a buyer purchases 
goods with the oral promise of paying later. These business “take dube” when they need to buy 
chickpea but do not have cash or they “give dube” when customers do not have the cash to pay 
them for their products. They give dube to a customer they have known for at least 2-6 months. 
Ikkub is also used as a means of financing. The extensive use of dube and the limited use of 
formal financial institutions like banks further strengthen the findings of the empirical model in 
the previous chapter that found trust to be have increased when trading partners make use of 
informal institutions. The dube system is based on trust and small-scale processors are willing to 
                                                          
8 Complementary foods are “foods that are readily consumed and digested by the young child and that 
provide addition nutrition to meet all the growing child's needs” (“Complementary feeding”, 2018)  
77 
 
take the risk associated with using this informal institution. Food processing companies can also 
further exploit the informal institutions that already exist in the dealing of farmers with buyers to 
increase the access to credit of their input suppliers. The increased marketed output to farmers 
gained from improved trust between trading partners can help in reducing the challenge food 
processing companies face from low supply and the mixing of high and low quality produce.    
Among the major companies interviewed, none used chickpea in very large amounts and so it 
was not very hard to get enough supply. However, price varies based on the time of year/ season 
the purchase is made. It is possible to have the desired amount of supply delivered within 2-3 
days during harvest season but it might take weeks in non-harvest times. The same price 
volatility is true for other local inputs like wheat, corn and soya beans. Price for soya beans have 
been more than 4 times than it was during harvest season. Chickpea is also exported out of the 
country so this can cause local shortages and further drive prices higher. Ethiopian is the largest 
producer of chickpea in Africa (63% of the continents production) and the 6th in the world 
(Ojiewo, 2016). The location of the factory also plays a role in the lead time for delivery. 
Chickpea is available in most parts of Ethiopia including around Addis Ababa where most 
factories are located. It is most abundantly available in Northern Ethiopia (particularly Amhara 
region). For companies sourcing their inputs from nearby locations the transit time is short. But 
those that buy from the Amhara region to minimize middle men cost and that demand a higher 
quantity might encounter longer lead times.  
The spot market, merchants (middle men), cooperatives/farmer unions, commercial farms and 
tenders might be used to obtain chickpea and other crops. It is not common to buy chickpea from 
commercial farms.  Food processing companies buy wheat and corn from commercial farmers 
which are farms owned either by the government or privately and which grows crop in a large 
scale level using modern technology. The most common channel for chickpea used by the 
companies that participated in this study is the merchants (middle men) who collect it from 
different farmers. This channel was also used for the purchase of other crops like wheat and corn. 
The major advantage in using this channel is the availability of the product whenever it is 
needed. The merchants are highly networked and are able to obtain crops when needed. The 
challenge of this channel is quality problems due to the deliberate mixing of different quality 
chickpeas to inflate the perceived quality.  
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Quality requirements for chickpea include the level of foreign matter (impurity), moisture, pest 
damage and, chickpea variety (varies based on the intended output). Quality is usually inspected 
by physical examination and laboratory during each delivery. Original price agreement is usually 
higher in the expectation that the quality is high. In cases where quality is compromised, 
products are returned or price is renegotiated in some companies. Price is renegotiated for lower 
quality only in the case where the issue is dirt level. Most inputs are further cleaned at the facility 
therefore, some companies are willing to take the extra time it is going to take to remove the dirt. 
In some instances, the sellers themselves offer a lower price than agreed as they do not want to 
incur additional transportation costs for returning with an unsold load. Though companies did 
face some problems with regards to chickpea quality, the problem with chickpea was not as 
severe as other crops like wheat and peanuts. One company has suspended its pasta production 
due to shortage of quality wheat. Quality inspection of production facilities is done by the 
government for both small and large scale food processing companies. 
Formal credit is available for the large scale-food processing companies as the government is 
currently implementing a policy which supports manufacturers that are processing agricultural 
products. However, access to foreign currency is a major challenge. Inputs like vitamin and 
mineral mix, milk powder, packaging (aluminum), whey powder, vegetable fat, different flavors 
and enzymes are imported. Due to the foreign currency shortage the country is facing, these 
companies have to wait longer (3-6 months) to obtain foreign currency even when priority is 
given to food processors.   
The processing companies are member of associations who share information about the market, 
new opportunities and available trainings and workshops. They also have a collective bargaining 
power in regards to government policy, tax issues and issues that arise with suppliers/buyers. 
These associations are the likes of Ethiopian Millers Association. This association represents the 
companies in putting forward complaints to government bodies regarding a certain policy or 
taxation or any common issues faced by the companies. The government also holds discussions 
with the associations before or during the implementation of different policies that might affect 
the industries.      
In summary, the interviews provided insights into the supply chain organization of the RUF 
product supply chain and the challenges encountered by different stakeholders. The challenge 
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facing many of these food processing companies is the unavailability of raw material/crops at a 
reasonable price except during harvest/peak season. Companies either have to buy all of their 
needs at the peak time which requires large sums of capital or suffer from low availability and 
very high prices at other times. Quality problem due to poor post-harvest practices, deliberate 
mixing/adulteration of different quality, and poor transportation is another major challenge. The 
foreign currency challenge is a significant hindrance to those companies that heavily rely on 
imported inputs, particularly for production of RUFs. However, the results from the quantitative 
analysis in chapter three which found the increased marketed output to farmers gained from 
improved trust between trading partners can help in reducing the challenge food processing 
companies face from low supply and the mixing of high and low quality produce. The existence 
of trust can increase the perceived trustworthiness of trading partners as there is the belief that 
honesty is expected from them and it will be reciprocated.  
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Chapter 5. Summary and Conclusion 
The objectives of this study were to identify the main actors and their interaction in the RUF 
product supply chain and to identify the areas where transaction costs are high and how 
institutions (formal and informal) could reduce these high transaction costs. The study 
investigated what role institutions play in promoting trust and information sharing and how trust 
and information sharing relate with each other. It also examined how trust and information 
sharing between trading partners impacted chickpea trade. The efficiency of the supply chain 
was also examined through insights gained from interviews with stakeholders. To meet the 
objectives and address the research questions, a structured questionnaire, focus group discussions 
and key informant interviews were carried out. Chickpea farmers, retailer and wholesalers and 
food processors, humanitarian organizations, national agencies and hospitals have participated.  
Qualitative analysis was used to gain insights about the supply chain from the interviews with 
RUF stakeholders, the focus group discussions with farmers and the wholesaler/retailer surveys. 
Structural equation modeling was used for the chickpea farmer’s survey data. The main findings 
are summarized in section 5.1 below. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss the policy implications of the 
study results, and the limitations and areas for further research, respectively.  
5.1 Summary of major research findings 
The study examined the effectiveness of informal institutions in building trust, information 
sharing and lowering transaction costs. It proposed that informal institutions can play a 
significant role in reducing opportunism and enhance information sharing in situations where it 
is hard to have formal institutions or where they are slow to develop, if ways are devised to 
utilize them tactfully. The main research question of the study was how informal institutions 
affect the level of trust and information sharing in the RUF supply chain in Ethiopia. 
The results from the structural equation modeling showed how participation and membership in 
formal/informal institutions impacts trust and information sharing and how trust and information 
sharing in turn affects the transaction costs associated with chickpea marketing. Chickpea 
farmers participated in five major institutions, Ikkub, Iddir, cooperatives, microfinance and 
political organization. The results indicate that membership in formal institutions like 
microfinance institutions and political institutions promoted information sharing between 
chickpea trading partners. Membership in cooperatives did not significantly affect information 
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sharing between trading partners. Participating in informal social institutions like Ikubb also 
promoted information sharing between partners but participation in Iddir did not affect 
information sharing. The level of trust between chickpea farmers and buyers positively affected 
participation in informal institution like Iddir and Ikubb. Being member of cooperatives and 
political party also improved the trust between farmers and traders. Membership in a 
microfinance institution did not positively affect the trust level. The study also found that trust 
between trading partners reduces the time farmers spent negotiating price with buyers. Trust 
between trading partners also increased the marketed surplus of farmers. Information sharing 
among trade partners positively affects trust between partners.  
The descriptive statistics in section 3.3 indicate that most of the farmer survey participants were 
well educated, male-dominated and had limited off-farm activity. Average land holding was 1.25 
hectares and chickpea yield was below the estimated level. Most farmers prefer to sell at the spot 
market due to the higher price obtained in this channel. The study identified survey participants 
were members of five major institutions. Two of these, Iddir and Ikub are informal institutions 
while microfinance, cooperatives and political organizations are categorized as formal.  
Food processing companies face a number of challenges which include the unavailability of raw 
material/crops at a reasonable price except during harvest/peak season; quality problems due to 
poor post-harvest practices, deliberate mixing/adulteration of different qualities, and poor 
transportation is another major challenge and; foreign currency shortage to buy imported inputs.  
The interviews provided insights into the supply chain structure of the RUF in Ethiopia. There 
are two parallel supply chains of RUF. One is run by UNICEF and the other by the government 
body of PFSA. USAID funds most of the procurement and distribution cost of the RUF available 
in the country. Local procurement is preferred and encouraged though it is limited as it accounts 
for only 20-30% of total procurement. The supply chain is efficient based on the key success 
indicators though there are areas for improvement. This potential areas of improvement include 
better storage facilities, increased number of local producers and reduced dependence on donor 
and humanitarian agencies. 
5.2 Implications  
Institutions have been recognized as an important element in economic behavior, transactions 
and economic growth and for this reason have been acknowledged and integrated into 
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development policy thinking (Dorward, Kydd, Morrison and Poulton, 2005). However, Doward 
and colleagues argue that the institutional policies devised have not been strong enough in 
addressing the challenges of poor rural areas in developing countries. The authors develop a 
conceptual framework where they propose the primary purpose of institutions in economies 
characterized by market failure and high transaction costs should not be to improve the 
performance of competitive markets. Rather, institutions should be the means/channels that 
perform the exchange and coordination function that could not be performed due to the absence 
of competitive markets. This way nonmarket institutions can effectively address market failure 
and high transaction costs in such countries. In line with this theory, the results of this study 
which found non-market institutions like Ikkub and Iddir to positively contribute to improved 
chickpea marketing, imply that such institutions facilitate exchanges and coordination. 
Therefore, policies that aim to solve the low marketed output and high transaction costs should 
strengthen such institutions or encourage participation. 
In southern Indian they have what is called “chit funds” which has exactly the same principles 
and organizational structure as Ikubb in Ethiopia. In southern India they have been legally 
organized by companies and draw thousands of people who do not even know each other. They 
function as well as banks, giving better interest rates than banks and can rival the formal banking 
system in terms of volume of funds if both the legally registered and informally organized chit 
funds were put together (Munshi, 2006). This is an example of non-market financial institutions 
that could well serve the purpose of formal financial institution. Ikubb in particular is a widely 
practiced form of obtaining credit throughout the different regions in Ethiopia with very minimal 
defaults and high participation rates. People have effectively used it for centuries to obtain credit 
in times of need. It is a well-established, widely accessible, easily formed/established 
organization that could provide participants with large sums of money which is not available any 
other way. The strong social and moral values associated with participation in Ikkub has 
minimized defaults and thus has made Ikubb an efficient and reliable source of obtaining credit 
in areas where it is difficult or impossible to monitor individual action or use legal institutions to 
enforce deals. Therefore, based on the finding of this study that find participation in Ikkub to 
improve information sharing and trust between chickpea traders, existing, local, nonmarket 
institutions in Northern Ethiopia can be as effective as formal institutions in providing financial 
services. Local governments and other NGOs that aim to promote agricultural growth and 
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development could help in formalizing and legalizing such institutions. Informal institutions can 
also be used by food processing companies. These companies can utilize the informal institutions 
that are predominant in the dealings of small-holder farmers, retailer, and wholesalers to reduce 
the transaction costs that arise from poor supply chains. Companies can encourage participation 
by prioritizing farmers that are engaged in such informal institutions or by supporting the 
adaption and application of informal institutions to suit the organization and need of their 
company.  
In addition, new RUFs supply chains and food processing companies can utilize these 
institutions to increase supply chain performance. However, issues like foreign currency 
problems and quality adulteration require policy measures that promote availability of foreign 
currency to manufactures and putting in place stricter quality assurance mechanisms and quality 
testing facilities. Additionally, the challenges food processing companies face in terms of 
obtaining a consistent amount and quality of inputs can be improved through the increased 
marketed output experienced by farmers due to increased trust between trading partners. The 
existence of trust further improves the dealing of trading partners by increasing honesty and 
fairness in trade as the same level of moral is expected (reciprocity).  
 
5.3 Limitation of the study and areas for further research 
The chickpea farmer survey was carried out only in Tigray in Northern Ethiopia which has a 
significant production of chickpea. However, the Amhara and Oromia regions are also major 
producers. Most of the chickpea that ends up in food processing companies comes from these 
two regions and a study in these areas will better inform chickpea marketing. The limitation of 
the study in only one area limits the implication of the findings to the whole country even though 
similarities exist in some features in all chickpea producing regions in Ethiopia. Further research 
in these other regions needs to clearly establish the applicability of the implications in these 
regions.  
There was also a difficulty in contacting middle men in the chickpea supply chain that play a 
crucial role in the supply chain. These middle men/ wholesalers are the major suppliers of 
chickpea to food processing companies and indeed serve as a bridge between several smallholder 
farmers scattered geographically and the food processing companies. Further studies about 
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supply chains that include these agents could provide important insights into the organization of 
the supply chain.  
The study has limitation in the total sample size used in the structural equation model. A large 
sample size can improve the fit of the model and makes the interpretation of the results more 
reliable. This study can draw only limited implications from the results and the lower CFI index 
of model 1 and model 5 call for a cautious interpretation of the results. Further studies that have 
larger sample sizes can strengthen the findings of this study and be a basis for government policy 
guidelines. The limited number of stakeholders, particularly food processing companies, 
interviewed also limits the insight gained from the interviews. All food processing factories were 
also located in the capital, Addis Ababa, thus limiting the application of insights to other regions. 
A country wide analysis of food processing companies can provide further insights.  
The study only identifies the challenges in the supply chains and does not investigate in detail the 
causes or the solutions of these issues. Further research that investigates the solutions to the 
challenges identified would inform policymakers about potential areas of intervention to improve 
the supply chain. How the lack of perfect information in such settings affect the interaction 
among institutions and trading partners is also an area that might be of interest for further 
research. In addition, only the role of domestic institutions is discussed in detail in relation to 
social capital and transaction costs. Further research could explore the role international 
institutions play in promoting trust and information sharing as well as lowering transaction costs 
in the RUF or other similar supply chains.  
The existence of corruption in formal institutions might hinder the trust and information sharing 
that are found to be improved by institutions examined in this study. Further research could 
explore how institutional failure due to corruption or other priorities of stakeholders in this 
institutions can lead to poor performance of supply chains and failure to remove the existing 
bottle necks in the supply chain.  
In conclusion, the thesis has examined the role institutions play in supply chain organization and 
has found that membership in informal institutions strengthens the trust and information sharing 
between trading partners and this in turn reduces the transaction costs associated with chickpea 
trade. In addition, the current performance of the RUF supply chain in Ethiopia is relatively 
efficient with some room for improvement in increasing quality adherence of manufactures in 
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order to increase the current level of local production and stabilizing the market for consistent 
availability of local and imported inputs.    
  
86 
 
 References 
Abebaw, D. & Haile, M. (2013). The impact of cooperatives on agricultural technology 
adoption: Empirical evidence from Ethiopia. Food Policy, 38, 82-91. 
doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2012.10.003 
Abera, H. (2010). Chickpea production, Supply, Demand and Marketing Issues in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia Commodity Exchange Authority 
Abidi, H. , Leeuw, S. & Klumpp, M. (2013). Measuring Success in Humanitarian Supply Chains. 
International Journal of Business and Management Invention, 2(8), 31-39.  
AGP, Agricultural Growth Program. (2017). Chickpea. Retrieved from 
http://ethioagp.org/chickpea-2/ 
Alemu, A. & Adesina, J. (2015). Market or Hybrid? Determinants of Agribusiness Actors’ 
Decision Behaviour in the Agrifood Supply Chain. The Journal of Commerce, 7(1), 23-
41.  
Alemu, A., Maertens, M., Deckers, J., Bauer, H. & Mathijs, E. (2016). Impact of supply chain 
coordination on honey farmers’ income in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia. Agricultural and 
Food Economics, 4(1). doi:10.1186/s40100-016-0053-x 
Andreassen, T., Lorentzen, B., & Olsson, U. (2006). The Impact of Non-Normality and 
Estimation Methods in SEM on Satisfaction Research in Marketing. Quality & Quantity, 
40(1), 39–58. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-005-4510-y 
Aramyan, L., Oude L., Alfons G. J. M., van der Vorst, Jack G. A. J., & van Kooten, O. (2007). 
Performance measurement in agri‐food supply chains: a case study. Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal, 12(4), 304-315. 
doi:10.1108/13598540710759826 
Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions. (2010). Agricultural finance potential in 
Ethiopia: Constraints and opportunities for enhancing the system. Retrieved from 
https://agriknowledge.org/downloads/5m60qr91n 
Atsbaha, A. (2008). Analysis of the Role of Cooperatives in Agricultural Input and Output 
Marketing in Southern Zone of Tigray, Ethiopia. Mekelle University, Mekelle. Retrieved 
from 
https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/85/Final_AlemaWoldemariam.pdf?sequ
ence=1&isAllowed=y 
87 
 
Awan, G.(2016). Retrieved from https://www.bayt.com/en/specialties/q/305392/what-are-the-
strategic-tactical-and-operational-levels-of-integrated-system/   
Batt, P. (2003). Examining the performance of the supply chain for potatoes in the Red River 
Delta using a pluralistic approach. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 
8(5), 442-454. doi:10.1108/13598540310500277 
Barrett, C. B., Bachke, M. E., Bellemare, M. F., Michelson, H. C., Narayanan, S., & Walker, 
T.F. (2012). Smallholder Participation in Contract Farming: Comparative Evidence from 
Five Countries. World Development, 40(4),715-730. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.09.006 
Beamon, B. M. (1998). Supply Chain Design and Analysis:Models and Methods International 
Journal of Production Economics, 55(3), 281-294.  
Bello, D., Lohtia, R. & Sangtani, V. (2004). An institutional analysis of supply chain innovations 
in global marketing channels. Industrial Marketing Management, 33(1), 57-64. 
doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2003.08.011 
Berhane, G., & Gardebroek, C. (2011). Does Microfinance Reduce Rural Poverty? Evidence 
Based on Household Panel Data from Northern Ethiopia. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 93(1), 43–55. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aaq126 
Berhane, G. , Dereje, M. , Hoddinott, J. , Koru, B., Nisrane, F. , Tadesse, F. , . . . Yohannes, Y. 
(2013). Ethiopia Strategy Support Program (ESSP) II: Agricultural Growth Program 
(AGP) of Ethiopia — Baseline report 2011. Retrieved from 
http://essp.ifpri.info/files/2013/03/ESSPII_EDRI_Report_AGP_Baseline.pdf 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. & Mccabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and 
Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142 
Bezu,S., Kassie,T., Shiferaw, B., Ricker-Gilbert,J.(2014). Impact of improved maize adoption on 
welfare of farm households in Malawi:a panel data analysis. World Dev. 59, 120-131 
Blandon, J., Henson, S. & Cranfield, J. (2009). Small-scale farmer participation in new agri-food 
supply chains: Case of the supermarket supply chain for fruit and vegetables in Honduras. 
Journal of International Development, 21(7), 971-984. doi:10.1002/jid.1490 
Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other 
Economic Institutions. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1), 75-111.  
88 
 
Cai, S., Jun, M. & Yang, Z. (2010). Implementing supply chain information integration in China: 
The role of institutional forces and trust. Journal of Operations Management, 28(3), 257-
268. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2009.11.005 
Capital.(2018). Retrieved from http://capitalethiopia.com/2018/04/02/hard-times-hard-
currency/#.W1JLU9JKjIU  
Caron, O. (2013, September 12). RUTF Product Specifications and Labeling Requirements 
Paper presented at the UNICEF SD, RUTF pre-bid conference, Copenhagen. 
Chaka, A., Kenea, T. & Gebresenbet, G. (2016). Analysis of the Supply Chain and Logistics 
Practices of Warqe Food Products in Ethiopia. Int. J. Food System Dynamics, 7(3), 213-
228. doi:10.18461/ijfsd.v7i3.733 
Chin, W. (1998). Commentary: Issues and Opinion on Structural Equation Modeling. MIS 
 Quarterly, 22(1), 7–16. 
Chipeta, M., Emana, B. & Chanyalew, D. (2015). Ethiopia’s Agriculture Sector Policy and 
 Investment Framework (2010–2020), External Mid-term Review. Retrieved from 
 http://www.agri-learning-ethiopia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Agriculture-Policy-
 MTR_FINAL.pdf 
Coase, R. H. (2013). The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law & Economics, 56(4), 837–
 877. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1086/674872 
Complementary Foods and Feeding:Nutritional companion to breastfeeding after 6 months. 
 (2018). Retrived from https://www.unicef.org/programme/breastfeeding/food.htm 
Cousins, P., Handfield, R., Lawson, B. & Petersen, K. (2006). Creating supply chain relational 
capital: The impact of formal and informal socialization processes. Journal of Operations 
Management, 24(6), 851-863. doi:10.1016/j.jom.2005.08.007 
Daniels, H. & Fors, S. (2015). Supply & Value Chain Analysis of Onions in Ethiopia. (Master of 
Science), SLU, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Swedish. Retrieved from 
http://stud.epsilon.slu.se 
 de Janvry, A., Fafchamps, M., & Sadoulet, E. (1991). Peasant Household Behavior with Missing 
Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained. The Economic Journal, 101(409), 1400–1417. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2234892 
89 
 
Dong, M.C., Ju, M. & Fang, Y. (2016). Role hazard between supply chain partners in an 
institutionally fragmented market. Journal of Operations Management, 46, 5-18. 
doi:10.1016/j.jom.2016.07.006 
Dorward, A., Kydd, J.,  Morrison, J. and Poulton, C. (2005). ‘Institutions, Markets and Economic 
 Co-ordination: Linking Development Policy to Theory and Praxis’, Development and 
Change, 36(1): 1–25. 
Dyer, J. , & Chu, Wujin (2003). The Role of Trustworthiness in Reducing Transaction Costs and 
Improving Performance: Empirical Evidence from the United States, Japan, and Korea. 
Organization Science Informs, 14(1), 57 - 68.  
ECX. (2009). Ethiopian Commodity Exchange. Retrieved from  
http://www.ecx.com.et/Operations.aspx#WH 
EGTE, Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise. (2017). Commodity Statistics.   Retrieved from 
http://www.egte-ethiopia.com/en/2014-03-29-12-35-07/egte/item/89-commodity-
statistics.html 
EIAR, MOH and EATA.(2013). Working Strategy for Strengthening Ethiopia’s Chickpea Value 
chain Vision, Systemic Challenges and Prioritized Interventions. Addis Ababa,Ethiopia 
EPOSPEA. (2017). Ethiopian Pulses, Oilseeds and Spices Processors-Exporters Association 
Retrieved from http://www.epospeaeth.org/index.php/about-epospea 
Fafchamps, M. & Minten, B. (2002). Returns to social network capital among traders. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 54(2), 173-206. 
FAOSTAT.(2017). Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC  
Gabre-Madhin, E. (2001). Market Institutions,Transaction Costs, and Social Capital in the 
Ethiopian Grain Market. Retrieved from 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/16540/1/rr010124.pdf 
GAIN. (2014). Ethiopia Grain and Feed Annual Report Retrieved from 
http://www.agrochart.com/en/news/3902/ethiopia-grain-and-feed-annual-apr-2014.html 
Gebremedhin, B., Jaleta, M. & Hoekstra, D. (2009). Smallholders, institutional services, and 
commercial transformation in Ethiopia. Agricultural Economics, 40, 773-787. 
doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2009.00414.x 
Greif, A. (1993). Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The 
 Maghribi Traders’ Coalition. American Economic Review, 83(3), 525. 
90 
 
Handfield, R. & Bechtel, C. (2002 ). The role of trust and relationship structure in improving 
supply chain responsiveness. Industrial Marketing Management, 31(367-382). 
Helmke, G. , & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics:A Research 
Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(04), 725-740. doi:10.1017/S1537592704040472 
Hernandez, M., Rashid, S., Lemma, S. & Kuma, T. (2017). Market Institutions and Price 
Relationships: The Case of Coffee in the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 99(3), 683-704. doi:10.1093/ajae/aaw101 
Hilary, R. S., Sseguya, H., & Kibwika, P. (2017). Information quality, sharing and usage in 
farmer organizations: The case of rice value chains in Bugiri and Luwero Districts, 
Uganda. Cogent Food & Agriculture, 3(1).Retrieved from  
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311932.2017.1350089 
Hoyle, R. (1995). Structural equation modeling : Concepts, issues, and applications. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Hobbs, J. (1996). A transaction cost approach to supply chain management. Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal, 1(2), 15-27. doi:10.1108/13598549610155260 
Hobbs, J.  (2004). Information asymmetry and the role of traceability systems. Agribusiness, 
 20(4),  397-415. doi:10.1002/agr.20020 
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1998). Fit Indices in Covariance Structure Modeling: Sensitivity to 
Underparameterized Model Misspecification, 3(4), 424–453. 
ISO.(2005). Retrieved from https://www.iso.org/standard/35466.html 
Isogai, Y. (2011). Value chain approach to increase production of RUTF/CSB. Field 
Exchange(40), 78-79. Retrieved from www.ennonline.net/fex/40/value   
Jabbar, M., Benin, S., Gabre-Madhin, E., & Paulos, Z. (2008). Market Institutions and 
Transaction Costs Influencing Trader Performance in Live Animal Marketing in Rural 
Ethiopian Markets. Journal of African Economies, 17(5), 747-764. 
doi:10.1093/jae/ejn004 
Johnson, Noel D., & Mislin, Alexandra A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 32(5), 865-889. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007 
Kalyar, M. , Naveed, T. , Anwar, S. & Iftikhar, K.  (2013). Supply Chain Information 
Integration: Exploring the Role of Institutional Forces and Trust Journal of Business 
Administration and Education, 3(1), 1-24.  
91 
 
Kaso, T. & Guben, G. (2015). Review of Barley Value Chain Management in Ethiopia. Journal 
of Biology, Agriculture and Healthcare, 5(10), 84-97.  
Kassie, M., Shiferaw, B. , Asfaw, S. , Abate, T., Muricho, G., Ferede, S., . . . Assefa, T. (2009). 
Current Situation and Future Outlooks of the Chickpea Sub‐sector in Ethiopia. Retrieved 
from http://www.icrisat.org/TropicalLegumesII/pdfs/Current_Situation.pdf 
Klein, D.. (1997). [Review of the book Trust, ethnicity, and identity: Beyond the new 
institutional economics of ethnic trading net-works, contract law, and. gift-exchange by 
Janet T. Landa]. Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 134-135.  
Kline, R. (2005). Principles and Practices of Structural Equation Modeling. New York, USA. 
The Guilford Press 
Komrska, J. (2012). Increasing Access to Ready-to-use Therapeutic Foods (RUTF). Field 
Exchange(42), 46-47.  
Komrska, J., Kopczak, L. R. & Swaminathan, J. M. (2013). When Supply Chains Save Lives. 
Supply Chain Management Review(January/ February), 42-49.  
Kwon, I.G. and Suh, T. 2004. Factors Affecting the Level of Trust and Commitment in Supply 
Chain  Relationships. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 40(1), 4-14. Retrieved from 
 https://doi-org.cyber.usask.ca/10.1111/j.1745-493X.2004.tb00165.x 
Laeequddin, M., Sahay, B. S., Sahay, V., & Abdul, K. (2010). Measuring trust in supply chain 
partners' relationships. Measuring Business Excellence, 14(3), 53-69. 
doi:10.1108/13683041011074218 
Landa, J. (1994). Trust, ethnicity, and identity: beyond the new institutional economics of ethnic 
trading networks, contract law, and gift-exchange: University of Michigan Press. 
Mackie, P., Brown, A., Smith, A., & GebreEgziabher, T. (2015). Microfinance and Poverty 
Alleviation in Ethiopia. Cardiff University. Retrieved from 
https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/581509/Ethiopia-Report-Jun-2015-
FINAL.pdf 
Manary, M.J. (2006). Local production and provision of ready-to-use therapeutic food for the 
treatment of severe childhood malnutrition. Food and Nutrition Bulletin, 27(3), 83-89.  
MANR, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource. (2017). Policies and Strategies Retrieved 
from http://www.moa.gov.et/web/pages/policies-and-strategies 
92 
 
MOFED, Ministry of Finiance and Economic Development. (2006). Ethiopia: Building on 
Progress.  A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASDEP). Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHIOPIA/Resources/PASDEP_Final_English.pd
f 
MOFED, Ministry of Finiance and Economic Development. (2010). Growth and Transformation 
Plan 2010/ 11 -20 14/ 15. Retrieved from 
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/eth144893.pdf 
Munshi, K. (2006).Nonmarket Institutions. Oxford Scholarship Online. 
DOI:10.1093/0195305191.003.0026.  
Mutonyi, S. , & Gyau, A. (2013). Measuring performance of small and medium scale agrifood 
firms in developing countries: Gap between Theory and Practice. Paper presented at the 
140th EAAE Seminar, “Theories and Empirical Applications on Policy and Governance 
of Agri-food Value Chains" Perugia, Italy. 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/eaa140/163339.html 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ojiewo, C. (2016). Chickpea Production, Technology Adoption and Market Linkages in 
Ethiopia. Pan-African Grain Legume and World Cowpea Conference. Livingstone, 
Zambia.  
Precise. (2014, November 04). Company Inaugurates First Ever Agri-Food Laboratory. The 
Ethiopian Herald. Retrieved from http://preciseethiopia.com/company-inaugurates-first-
ever-agri-food-laboratory/ 
Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. . The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. Retrieved September 12, 2017, from Project MUSE database. Journal 
of Democracy, 6(1), 65-78.  
Rashid, S., Abate, G., Lemma, S., Warner, J., Kasa, L. & Minot, N. (2015). The Barley Value 
Chain in Ethiopia. Retrieved from http://www.ifpri.org/publication/barley-value-chain-
ethiopia 
93 
 
Reardon, T. , Chen, K., Minten, B. & Adriano, L. (2012). The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food 
Value Chains: Enter the Dragon, the Elephant, and the Tiger. Mandaluyong City, 
Philippines: Asian Development Bank and International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Schumacker, R. E., & Lomax, R. G. (2010). A beginner’s guide to structural equation modeling 
 (3. ed). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Segre, J., Liu, G., & Komrska, J. (2016). Local versus offshore production of ready-to-use 
therapeutic foods and small quantity lipid-based nutrient supplements. Maternal & Child 
Nutrition. doi:10.1111/mcn.12376 
Shiferaw, B., & Teklewold, H. (2007). Structure and functioning of chickpea markets in 
Ethiopia: Evidence based on analyses of value chains linking smallholders and markets. 
Retrieved from https://cgspace.cgiar.org/handle/10568/571 
Statista. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/502058/mobile-cellular-
subscriptions-per-100-inhabitants-in-ethiopia/ 
Sutter, M. and Kocher,M.(2007). Trust and trustworthiness across different age groups. Games 
and Economic Behavior 59(2), 364-382. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.006  
Swaminathan, J. (2009). UNICEF’S Plumpy'nut Supply Chain. Retrieved from 
https://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/~/media/Files/documents/cse/unicef-plumpy-nut-
supply-chain.pdf 
Tarozzi, A., Desai, J. & Johnson, K. (2015). The Impacts of Microcredit: Evidence from 
Ethiopia. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1), 54-89. 
doi:10.1257/app.20130475 
Tefera, T. (2014). Analysis of Chickpea Value Chain and Determinants of Market Options 
Choice in Selected Districts of Southern Region: A Case of CIFSRF Call3 Project. 
Journal of Agricultural Science and Technology, 6(10). doi:10.5539/jas.v6n10pxx 
Troubé, C. (2012). Nutriset, a company at the heart of the nutritional revolution. The journal of  
Field Actions Science Reports(Special Issue 5). 
UNESCO. (2007). http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/et 
UNICEF. (2009). A supply chain analysis of Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Foods for the horn of 
Africa: The Nutrition Articulation Project. Retrieved from 
94 
 
http://supplychainsforchildren.org/en/Supply-Chain-Stories/A-supply-chain-analysis-of-
ready-to-use-therapeutic-foods-for-the-Horn-of-Africa 
UNICEF. (2013). Evaluation of Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM): 
Global Synthesis Report. Retrieved from 
https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/Final_CMAM_synthesis_FINAL_VERSION_
with_ExSum_translations.pdf 
UNICEF. (2017). Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food:Current Outlook. Retrieved from 
https://www.unicef.org/supply/files/Ready-to-
use_Therapeutic_Food_Current_Outlook.pdf 
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2017). World 
Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables. Retrieved 
from https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf 
United Nations Development Programme. (2014). Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining 
Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerability and Building Resilience. New York, NY: 
United Nations Development Programme. 
USAID. (2012). Agricultural Growth Program- Agribusiness and Market Development(AGP-
AMDE) Project: Business Enabling Environmnet Assesment. Retrieved from 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KRTJ.pdf 
USAID. (2015). Agricultural Growth Program- Agribusiness and market Development 
project.USAID Quarterly Report. Retrieved from 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KRTW.pdf 
USAID. (2017, August 15, 2017). Ethiopia: Nutrition. Retrieved from 
https://www.usaid.gov/ethiopia/nutrition 
van Dijk, M. & Trienekens, J. (2011). Global Value Chains. Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS: 
Amsterdam University Press. 
Verkaat, S., Munyua, B., Mausch,K., Michler,J. (2017).Welfare impacts of improved chickpea 
adoption: A pathway for rural development in Ethiopia? Food Policy 66, 50-61 
Wagh, V. & Deore, B. (2015). Ready to Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF): An Overview. Advances 
In Life Sciences And Health, 2(1), 1-15.  
WHO. (2017, May 2017). Malnutrition: Factsheet. Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/malnutrition/en/ 
95 
 
WHO, WFP, & UNICEF. (2007). Community -based Managment of Severe Acute Malnutrtion. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/Statement_community_based_man_sev_acute_mal_e
ng.pdf 
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization. The Journal of 
Law and Economics, 36(1, Part 2), 453–486. https://doi.org/10.1086/467284 
Yee, W. M. S., & Yeung, R. M. W. (2010). An Empirical Examination of the Role of Trust in 
Consumer and Supplier Relationship of Little Direct Contact: A Structural Equation 
Modeling Approach. Journal of International Food & Agribusiness Marketing, 22(1–2), 
143–163. https://doi.org/10.1080/08974430903373003 
Zhang, X. & Hu, D. (2011). Farmer‐buyer relationships in China: the effects of contracts, trust 
and market environment. China Agricultural Economic Review, 3(1), 42-
53.doi:10.1108/17561371111103534 
96 
 
Appendix 
Appendix A:  Results from the logistic regression  
To examine if informal institutions/trust enhances RUTF supply chain performance by 
increasing the use of enforceable contractual agreements a binary logistic model was used. 
Whether a farmer has any form of written contractual agreement regarding the production or 
marketing of chickpea is used as the dependent variable (the dependent variable is 1 if the farmer 
has a written contractual agreement, 0 if not).The random selection of participants based on 
production of chickpea minimizes the selection bias that could occur due to unobservable traits 
that explain participation in contractual agreements. Of the 148 households 38 households (about 
26%) had a written agreement. These contracts were either with microfinance institutions or the 
local government agriculture office for breeder seed.  
Variable (Dependent Variable: Contractual agreement) Coefficient (Robust standard 
errors) 
Age(years) -0.019(0.025) 
Gender(Female) -0.47(0.728) 
Household size -0.343**(0.235) 
Education (years) -0.010(0.102) 
Income -0.002(0.000) 
Amount of harvested chickpea 0.002(0.002) 
Land size -0.47(0.537) 
Ownership of Radio -1.715**(0.852) 
Ownership of Mobile phone -0.352(0.697) 
Member of a political party 1.736(1.473) 
Member in a microfinance institution 2.539***(0.781) 
Member in a Co-op or farmers association 3.439***(1.064) 
Member in an Iddir 0.383(0.574) 
Member in an Ikkub -0.431(0.964) 
Information source agriculture extension worker 2.529**(1.193) 
Information source local market 0.797(1.175) 
Information source buyers -1.608(1.229) 
Information source friends -1.530(1.085) 
Negotiation time -0.002(0.004) 
Sell to Wholesalers -0.613(1.255) 
Sell directly to consumers -1.452(1.428) 
Chickpea variety grown(white) 1.312(0.969) 
Chickpea variety (both red and white) 0.863(0.682) 
Off-farm activity -0.221(0.951) 
Trust in trading partner 0.501(0.460) 
Constant 0.376(3.17) 
n=140; Pseudo R2=0.493; Wald χ2 (26) =58.04; Prob >χ2= 0.0003 
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*significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 10%     
The results show that obtaining information from an agricultural extension worker positively 
increased the likelihood of having a contractual agreement. Being members of a cooperative, 
microfinance or political party also increase probability of participation. This is in line with  the 
hypothesis and other similar studies that found membership in a cooperative or some form or 
farmers organization mattered to farmers’ decisions to participate in contract agreements because 
it lowered transaction costs and increased welfare of participants through increased marketed 
surplus, improved access to farm inputs and increased bargaining power (Barrett et al., 2012). 
Trust did not have a significant effect on participation in a written contractual agreement, neither 
did membership in Ikkub or Iddir. This is in contrast to the expected result and the literature 
which finds significant positive relationship or complementary effect between the two variables 
(Blandon, et al., 2009; Zhang and Hu, 2011). This could be because the survey instrument 
measured trust with supply chain partners, whereas the contract variable measures participation 
in contracts related to microfinancing and breeder seed. Having a larger household size and 
owning a radio reduced the probability of having a contractual agreement.  
The few number of observation obtained from the survey regarding contractual agreements (very 
few household with contractual agreements regarding chickpea) has limited the analysis and is 
the reason why the regression results are not included in the main thesis. 
 
Appendix B: The OLS regression results 
The table below is results from an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors. 
The dependent variable is trust which is obtained from a principal component analysis based on 
17 Likert-based survey questions. The variable trust is the average of the survey participants’ 
response to the Likert questions that range from 1-5 based on the level of agreement 
/disagreement with regards to the statements related with trust. The variable information sharing 
and satisfaction are also obtained from the principal component analysis. Similar with the trust 
variable there value is the average of the responses to the questions that relate to each measure. 
Information sharing is used as an explanatory variable in the regression analysis along with 
contractual agreement variable, membership in institutions, source of price information and 
socio-economic variables. The description of all the variables used and the results of the 
regression are presented in the table below. 
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N=136; R2=0.644; F (22,113) =11.63; Prob>F=0.00; Root MSE=0.405 
*significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 10% 
The F-test and the small values of the root MSE show a good fit of the model. Some of the socio-
economic factors are significant indicating the effect they have on the level of trust between 
trading partners. Age and schooling negatively affects the level of trust while land size and 
amount of chickpea harvested positively influence trust. As once age increases, one might have 
already experienced some incidences of defaults or being cheated and this might negatively 
affect trust with different trading partners. An experimental trust game carried out in eight 
different countries finds that trust increases with age up to early adulthood but becomes constant 
once adulthood is reached (Sutter and Kocher, 2007). Trust entails some risk and studies have 
shown that age and education are associated with risk aversion, mistrust of new technology and 
Variable description Coefficient (Robust 
standard errors) 
Dependent variable Trust 
Information sharing 0.489***(0.061) 
Unwritten Contractual agreement -0.073(0.103)     
Written contractual agreement 0.122(0.103) 
Off-farm activity -0.052(0.084) 
Trading partner member of the same 
institution 
0.159(0.114) 
Amount of harvested chickpea 0.084**(0.036) 
Land size 0.214***(0.056) 
Ownership of Mobile phone -0.137(0.097) 
Member of a political party 0.196*(0.112) 
Member in a microfinance institution -0.07**(0.033) 
Member in a Co-op or farmers 
association 
0.162**(0.073) 
Member in an Iddir 0.210***(0.068) 
Member in an Ikkub 0.005(0.079) 
Information source agriculture extension 
worker 
-0.088(0.116) 
Information source local market -0.1(0.098) 
Information source buyers -0.028(0.125) 
Information source friends 0.003(0.096) 
Negotiation time 0.0001(0.0002) 
Income  -0.0001(0.000) 
Gender(Female) 0.013(0.097) 
Age -0.007**(0.003) 
School -0.026*(0.014) 
Constant 1.918***(0.3) 
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lower rates of land allocation to new seed varieties (Bezu, Kassie, Shiferaw, Ricker-Gilbert, 
2014; Verkaat, Munyua, Mausch, Michler,J., 2017). 
  
An unexpected result is the fact that contracts, whether written or unwritten, had no statistically 
significant effect on trust. This could be due to the volatility of chickpea prices which farmers 
mentioned as a major challenge. Focus group discussion and interviews with the farmers 
revealed that farmers prefer to sell in the spot market at the going price as prices are volatile and 
pre-agreements on price is risky. In the contract farming literature price volatility is usually a 
positive case for preferring contract farming (Barrett et al., 2012). However, market failure in 
terms of missing markets, the lack of strong markets and or the high risk involved in such 
markets might deter farmers from acting rationally (de Janvry, Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991). In 
addition, farmers who reported having an unwritten contract were mostly using short term 
agreements about price, quality and the quantity of the chickpea with known customers, which 
took the form of preordering chickpea for pickup or delivery in a few days. The other types of 
contracts were mostly with the local agriculture offices where the farmer is given seeds free of 
charge which could be a special variety or require a certain farming technique and the farmer has 
to return only the seed initially given out for the experiment. 
The amount of chickpea harvested and the amount of land owned by a household positively 
influences the level of trust in a trading partner.  A Pearson correlation coefficient shows the 
amount of harvested output and land size are not correlated, thus justifying the use of both 
amount of harvested chickpea and land size in the regression.  Fertilizer, pesticide or improved 
seed were also not correlated with the amount harvested or with yield. In contrast, the marketed 
amount and harvested amount were highly and significantly correlated.  
 
Membership in a political party, cooperatives or farmers association and Iddir positively and 
significantly affect the level of trust, while being a member of a microfinance organization 
negatively affects trust. Information sharing (a construct obtained  from the factor analysis) is 
positively associated with trust as expected, and in line with another study that also found that 
information sharing improves the level of trust by lowering uncertainty (Kwon and Suh, 2004). 
Membership in microfinance institutions is defined in the data as any credit received from a 
formal or informal credit institution (including from trading partners). The negative relationship 
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could be due to the mistrust that is usually associated with microfinance institutions. Most 
microfinance institution users in Ethiopia use the regular banking system to save money but use 
microfinances to obtain the loans (Mackie et al., 2015).Microfinance institutions, though playing 
a significant role in poverty reduction ((Berhane & Gardebroek, 2011), have yet to build 
sufficient trust to realize their full potential (Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions, 
2010). 
 
The results from this regression is not included in the primary analysis of the thesis because the 
structural equation model better explains the proposed hypothesis of the study and the data. In 
addition, the structural equation model better captured the objectives of the study and the results 
from the SEM model were consistent with prior expectation and literature in the area.  
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Appendix C Survey Instruments 
 
  Participant Consent Form 
(Survey participants) 
   
You are invited to participate in a research study entitled: Role of informal institutions in 
the RUF supply chains in Ethiopia 
         
Researcher(s): Melat Adde, Graduate student, Agriculture and Resource Economics, University 
of Saskatchewan, +1 306-514-3601, mla398@mail.usask.ca 
Supervisor: Dr. Jill Hobbs, Agriculture and Resource Economics,+ 1 306 966-2445, 
jill.hobbs@usask.ca   
Purpose(s) and Objective(s) of the Research:  
 The purpose of the study is examine the supply chain for ready-to –use food products in 
Ethiopia and identify bottlenecks and potential areas of improvement along the supply chain. 
Procedures:  (What you will be asked to do when you participate in the study): 
 You will be asked to sit with the research assistant to answer questions about the production 
and marketing of some of the crops you grow 
 This discussion might take about an hour. 
 Please feel free to ask any questions regarding the procedures and goals of the study or your 
role. 
Funded by:  
 This study is supported by Global Institute for Food Security (GIFS) at the University of 
Saskatchewan (Canada) 
Potential Risks:  
 There are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this research  
Potential Benefits:  
 The outcome of the study can be used to identify challenges and potential improvements in 
the production and marketing of your crops.  
Confidentiality:  
 All the information we will collect from you will be kept strictly confidential. All data will be 
reported in aggregate form so that it will not be possible to identify individuals who participate 
in the survey.  
Storage of Data: 
 Consent forms and the questionnaire will be kept in a locked room with the student’s 
supervisor for about five years until findings are published and shared to relevant bodies. 
All electronic files will be stored in a password protected files. When the data are no 
longer required, it will be destroyed safely with a program that will not allow deleted data 
to be recovered. 
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Right to Withdraw:   
 Your participation is voluntary and you can answer only those questions that you are 
comfortable with.  You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any 
time without explanation or penalty of any sort. 
 Should you wish to withdraw, you can do so at any time  
 Your right to withdraw data from the study will apply until data have been pooled. After 
this point, it is possible that some form of research dissemination will have already 
occurred and it may not be possible to withdraw your data 
Follow up:  
 To obtain results from the study, please contact your local agriculture office.  
Questions or Concerns:  
 Contact the researcher(s) using the information at the top of page 1; 
 This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board.  Any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant may be addressed to that committee through the Research Ethics Office 
ethics.office@usask.ca by calling +1-306-966-2975 collect.  
Consent (Oral Consent) 
 Do you have any questions regarding your participation in the study? Are you willing to 
participate in this study?    Yes         No     
 I read and explained this Consent Form to the participant before receiving the participant’s 
consent, and the participant had knowledge of its contents and appeared to understand it.  
 
 
     
Name of Participant  Researcher’s Signature  Date 
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University of Saskatchewan 
College of Agriculture and Bioresources 
     Questionnaire for assessing the supply chain of ready to use therapeutic food products  
 
Name of administrative unit/ Kebele: ___________ Region: _____________ 
Date of interview: __________________ Interviewers name: ________________ 
Part I: Questionnaire for farmers 
No Questions Response options (coded) 
1.1 The following questions are regarding yourself and the composition of your family/ household 
 Do you grow chickpea? 0. No 
1. Yes 
*Proceed to the next questions only if participants 
answer Yes. 
101 How old are you? _________________ Years 
102 Gender 1. Male    2. Female 
103 Household Composition 
Number of : 
Male children =________                                    
Female children=_______ 
Mother and Father= _______ 
Other people staying in the household=_______ 
Total household size= _______ 
104 What is the highest level of 
schooling you have achieved? 
____________________ 
*105 
 
Who is the head of the 
household? 
 
 1. Myself               
 2. My spouse              
 3. My Parents 
 4. My spouse’s parents 
 5. Other, specify ______________ 
106 What is your usual 
occupation?  
1. Farmer   
2. Tenant  Farmer          
3. Civil Servant            
4. Agricultural Labor 
5. Non-agricultural daily Labor            
6. Self- Employed 
7. Unemployed        
8. Other _____________ 
107 What kind of work do you 
do other than your main 
occupation?    
1. Farmer   
2. Tenant  Farmer          
3. Civil Servant            
4. Agricultural Labor 
Participant’s code: ______________ 
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5. Non-agricultural daily Labor            
6. Self- Employed 
7. Unemployed        
8. Other _____________                
108 What is the average monthly 
income of your household?  
 
109 Does your household own 
any animals? 
Animals                      
Ox 
Cow 
Goat 
Sheep 
Donkey 
Horse/mule 
Other 
 
No             Yes             Number 
0                     1              ________ 
0                     1              ________ 
0                     1              ________ 
0                     1              ________          
0                     1              ________ 
0                     1              ________  
0                     1              ________ 
110 Do you have any of the 
following things in your 
house that are functioning?  
 
1. Radio/ tape player  
2. Television                   
3.  Mobile phone  
4. Weighing equipment         
5. Bicycle            
6. Horse/donkey cart      
7. Other _________________ 
1.2 The following questions are regarding your production of chickpea 
111 Who owns the land you 
cultivate?   
*more than one option is 
possible 
1. Myself  
2. family/ relative 
3. Landlord 
4. Other__________ 
112 What is the size of all the land 
you cultivate (including own 
land, rented or tenant farmed 
land)? 
 ______ ha  
 ______ Timad 
113 How much chickpea did you 
harvest in the last 2 harvesting 
seasons (from all lands)?  
_______quintals 
_______ Madaberia (______kg) 
 
114 What chickpea variety do you 
grow? 
1. Desi  
2. Kabuli  
3. Both 
4. Other ________ 
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**115 How many chickpea per 
hectare/per Timad do you 
produce?  
*Yield per hectare 
 
______________ Madaberia/gonya 
1.3 The following questions are regarding the marketing of your produce and the relationship with 
your  trading partners 
116 What do you do with the 
chickpea you produce? What 
percentage/amount is used for 
each? 
1.Household consumption (________Madaberia) 
2. Store it for seed (________Madaberia) 
3. Sell it (________Madaberia) 
4. Other________________ (________Madaberia) 
117 During the previous harvest 
season how much did you sell to 
each of the following buyers? 
*Answer should sum to 100% 
1. Wholesalers(________Madaberia) 
2. Retailers(________Madaberia) 
3. Consumers(________Madaberia) 
4. Cooperatives(________Madaberia) 
5. Food processors(________Madaberia) 
6. Localassembler/brokers(________Madaberia) 
7. Other (________Madaberia) 
118 How long (months/years) have 
you traded with your major/most 
important buyer?  
*Answer only for the one that 
applies 
1. Wholesalers___________ 
2. Retailers_____________ 
3. Consumers_______ 
4. Cooperatives_________ 
5. Food processors_________ 
6. Local assembler_______ 
7. Other ____________ 
119 Reason for choosing this buyer 1. Offers the highest price 
2. Nearest to me 
3.  I know/trust him/her 
4. I have always sold to this buyer 
5. He/she buys my other crops  
6. I have no other choice 
7. Other ____________ 
120 How far do you typically travel 
to sell your chickpea? 
 
__________ hours 
121 How is the chickpea usually 
transported? 
1. On foot/back 
2. Donkey 
3. Cart 
4. Public transport  
5. Other_____________ 
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122 How long does it take to sell a 
kg of your chickpea Average 
time spent in finding and 
negotiating a deal  
 
_______________min/hrs 
123 Where do you store surplus 
chickpea?  
1. Do not have surplus 
2.Inside house 
3.Separate storage facility on farm 
4.Shared storage facility outside farm (at a co-op 
or other location 
5.Other____________ 
124 Why do you store your 
chickpea?   
1. I don’t store Chickpea   
2. To sell when prices go up 
3. To sell at another  market with higher price 
4. For seed 
5. For consumption 
6. Other _________ 
125 In transactions of the most 
recent harvest, has your 
chickpea been 
returned/remain unsold due 
to the following reasons 
*more than one option is 
possible 
1. Low demand 
2. Disagreement about price/buyer offered low 
price   
3. Lack of buyers 
4. Low/poor quality  
5. Other________ 
126 How often has your 
chickpea been 
returned/remain unsold for 
the above reasons? 
1. Never 
2. Occasionally//less than 2-3 times 
3. Sometimes/ 2-3 times in the recent harvest 
4. Frequently/more than 2-3 times 
5. Always 
127 Which qualities does your 
most important buyer 
require from you? 
1. Size 
2. Chickpea variety 
3. Amount of dirt 
4. Level of pest damage 
5. Other ___________ 
**128 Do you use any of the following 
on your farm? 
1.Fertlizer 
2. Pesticide 
3. Improved seed  
**129 How do you access/find these 
inputs?  
1. I Purchase them directly from the Market 
2.I get them from Cooperatives  
3. I get them from Government office/local kebele 
or woreda 
4. Other ________ 
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130 Where do you get information on 
how to use the above inputs on 
your farm? 
1. Agriculture Extension workers 
2. Neighbours/friends 
3. Own experience 
4. Trading partners 
5. Other _________ 
131 Where do you get price 
information for your chickpea?  
1. Friends/neighbours 
2.Buyer  
3.Local market 
4. Radio/Television 
5. Broker 
6. Agriculture extension workers 
7. Other _________ 
*132 
 
If a broker is used, how do you 
find a broker?  
 
133 Do you have any form of 
written agreement with your 
any of your buyers 
regarding price or quantity 
of chickpea? If yes, Please 
specify what type of 
agreement it is and with 
whom (retailer, wholesaler, 
local assembler…)?  
 
134 Do you have any form of 
unwritten agreement with 
any of your buyers 
regarding price or quantity 
of chickpea? If yes, Please 
specify what type of 
agreement it is and with 
whom (retailer, wholesaler, 
local assembler…)? 
 
135 Are you a member of any of the 
following?  
*More than one option is 
possible 
1. Ikkub 
2. Iddir 
3. Farmer Cooperatives  
4. Farmer’s club/association 
5. I am not a member of any of these 
6. Other ___________  
136 If member of a cooperative, what 
benefits do you get as a 
member?  
1. Credit/loan for farming 
2. Credit/loan for other non-farming activities 
3. demand for my chickpea/buys my chickpea 
4. demand for my other crops 
5. Farm inputs(seed, fertilizer, pesticide) 
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6. undertakes storing, selling, marketing on my 
behalf  
7. Information about price/demand of chickpea 
8. Other ___________ 
137 Is your most important/frequent 
buyer a member of these 
associations?   
1. Ikkub 
2. Iddir 
3. Farmer Cooperatives  
4. Farmer’s club/association 
5. Other ___________  
6. We are not a member of  the same associations 
138 How have you used money from 
your Ikkub for costs related with 
producing/transporting/ 
packaging chickpea?  
1. Have not used money from Ikkub for cost 
related with chickpea 
2. To buy seeds, fertilizer or pesticide 
3. To transport chickpea/ buy packaging material 
for chickpea 
4. To build storage facility 
5. To hire agriculture labour  
6. Other __________  
139 How often have you used money 
from Ikkub for costs related with 
chickpea production and 
marketing 
1. Never 
2. Occasionally 
3. Frequently 
4. Always 
140 Do you have access to 
agriculture extension 
workers/services for your 
chickpea? 
0. No 
1. Yes  
141 If yes to 142, what kind of 
service do you get from them? 
1. Training on how to use fertilizer, improved seed, 
pesticide 
2. Information about demand/price of chickpea 
3. Training on how to plant and grow chickpea 
4. Information about services available to farmers 
5. Other__________ 
142 Have you used any other 
institutions that provide training 
on how to plant and sell 
chickpea?  If yes, please list all 
of them. 
1.No,I haven’t used any 
2. No, such institutions do not exist  
3. Yes, I have used ________________(this 
institutions) 
143 How do you deal with 
disagreements with trading 
partners? 
 
144 How far do you have to go for 
the above service?  
__________hrs 
145 What do you think is the major 
challenge you face in producing 
and selling chickpeas? 
 
 
109 
 
1.4 To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding your major/most 
important/frequent trading partner (buyer) of chickpea?  
No. 
 
 
Response options (coding) 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
(neither 
agree nor 
disagree) 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
301 
I have good cooperation with 
my major trading partner/ 
he(she) is cooperative 
1 2 3 4 5 
302 I have a number of conflicts 
with my major/most 
important trading partner. 
1 2 3 4 5 
303 
My major/most important 
trading partner treats me 
fairly and equitably.  
1 2 3 4 5 
304 
Trading with my partner is 
less risky than other partners 
1 2 3 4 5 
305 
My major trading partner 
always keeps his (her) 
promises   
1 2 3 4 5 
306 
My major trading partner is 
honest 
1 2 3 4 5 
307 
My major trading partner has 
a good reputation 
1 2 3 4 5 
308 
I believe the information my 
major/most important  trading 
partner provides  
1 2 3 4 5 
309 
I have a close relationship 
with my major /most 
important trading partner 
1 2 3 4 5 
310 My major/most important 
trading partner considers my 
best interests in our dealings 
1 2 3 4 5 
311 
I have confidence in my 
major/most important trading 
partner  
1 2 3 4 5 
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312 
My major/most important 
trading partner provides 
financial assistance when I 
need it 
1 2 3 4 5 
313 
My  major/most important 
trading partner shares useful 
information with me 
1 2 3 4 5 
314 
I share useful information 
with my  major/most 
important  trading partner 
1 2 3 4 5 
315 
My  major/most important 
trading partner is willing to 
share risk with me 
1 2 3 4 5 
316 
My  major/most important 
trading partner has the best 
offer relative to other 
alternatives 
1 2 3 4 5 
317 
My  major/most important 
trading partner has confidence 
in me 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Part 2.  Interview Guide for Focus Group Discussion with local farmers  
1.  A. Please mention the most commonly grown type of chickpea in your area and  
B. For what purpose do you normally grow chickpea? [Clue: own consumption, for market    
purposes, etc.?] 
2. Can you discuss the challenges in the production of chickpea in your area? 
3. What are the major marketing channels for the produced chickpea? / Who buys your 
chickpeas? 
4. Are your buyer’s good/considerate people, do they consider your interests when dealing with 
you? 
5. Is there any association/cooperative between chickpea farmers in your region?  
5. Do you use Ikuub/dube or other such associations for cost related with the production and 
distribution of Chickpea? 
6. Consider the practice of many years of chickpea production, marketing and distribution in 
your area:  
    A. Has it changed from what it used to be in the past? 
    B. If there is any change in the crop production practice, marketing, or transport, what was/is   
causing it? 
7. What do you think are the major issues that need to be addressed to increase the amount of 
chickpea marketed and the profit you earn from it?   
 
Part 3. Interview guide questions for food processors 
1. When was your company established?  
2. What are the products that your company produces? 
3. Which products have chickpea as an ingredient? What do you prepare from the chickpea? 
4. When did it start processing chickpea/Ready-to- use food products? 
5. What type of processing does the chickpea undertake? 
6. From where do you get your supply of chickpea? Do the seller bring it or you go get it? 
7. Do you do contracts, cooperatives or spot market supply? When are price for purchase paid? 
Are suppliers reliable?   
8. How long does it take to get supplies? 
9. How often do you purchase chickpea? What quantity have you requited annually? How is 
price for chickpea determined (negotiation, ongoing market price, suppliers offer)?  
10. Are all your inputs imported or locally sourced? Why the preference for local/imported? 
Name of community: ________________ 
Date of Discussion: ________________ 
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10. Are suppliers able to adjust supply to change in demand – if you require a larger or lower 
amount of supply? If so how long does it take to do so? 
11. Have you received an amount that is lower than a pre-agreed amount? Breach of contract? 
How do you manage these? 
12. Do you have quality requirements from/to suppliers including the type of chickpea? How do 
you inspect? Do you offer different price for quality? Do you face quality problems? 
13. How much time do you spend buying chickpea, transporting it, checking out prices? 
14. What is the major challenge you face in buying this crops? 
15. How accessible is credit/ getting capital or, loans from banks or other financial institutions? 
16. Are you a member of food processors association or any other association\club\Ikubb?  
17. What are the benefits of membership in the above associations? 
For the processing companies that have ready-to –use or relief products (Hilina, Guts, 
FAFA) 
18. To whom do you supply/sell the final product? Do you see it directly to NGO’s or distribute 
it via health facilities?  
19. Do you produce based on demand or a certain amount periodically? 
20. How much do you supply for each NGO/Government. 
21. How is price determined for your product?  
22. How do you transport output/deliver to buyer?  
23. What are the benefits of the chosen channel and the challenges? 
24. How involved are International organization in the production and distribution of your 
products?  
25. What specifications are required from NGO’s and buyers like UNICEF? 
24. How do you ensure your products are in compliance with national and other quality and 
safety standards? What role do other companies (like Nutriset) play in meeting these standards?   
25. Does the specification/requirements change over time and do you have innovations to new 
formulations that meet these requirements? Particularly regarding aflatoxin. 
 
Part 4. Interview questions for health facilities that administer RUTF  
1. Which section is responsible for the acquiring/ administration of RUTF in your facility? 
2. Which types of RUTF do you use?  
3. Where do you get your supply of RUTF? NGO? Ministry of health? 
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4. How is RUTF order placed in the hospital? Does the government/NGO supply a fixed 
amount or you request a specific number? 
5. How is it transported? Your own transport or the supplier? Who pays for the transport cost?  
6. Does the supply/Provision of RUTF match your demand? If not, by how much is the 
disparity? 
7. How long does it take on average for orders to arrive?  
8. Do orders arrive on time? How much do you order at a time? 
9. How long does one delivery last? 
10. Do you usually have enough RUTF in stock? How much is currently available in stock? 
11. When do you place orders? When stock reach a certain level, periodically, based on demand 
or regularly? 
12. In the last six month, how many persons have been returned because RUTF was not 
available? 
13. Does RUTF ever expire while in stock? How many? 
14. During emergencies, were your request for additional RUTF meet? How long did it take to 
get them? 
15. Do persons or care takers of RUTF receivers ever complain of allergies, bad taste or 
dislike/unacceptability of the product? 
16. Does your facility has any problem with missing product after delivery (from available 
stock)? 
17. What are the major challenges in the order and supply of RUTF products in your facility?  
18. What measures do you think will improve/solve these challenges?  
 
Part 5. Interview questions for UNICEF country office, WFP and Government recruiters 
1. Where do you get your supply of RUF and relief products? What percentage form each 
company? Local/International? 
2. Are the companies able to meet demand?  
3. What is the average time it takes from order to delivery? 
3. Do you get supplies in the time frame that was previously agreed?  
4. Do you have a contractual agreement? Has there been a britches of the contract? How was it 
handled (legally court, third party)?  
4. When you place orders during emergencies are they able to adjust production and met 
demand? 
5. What quality requirements do you have and where do/how do you inspect these quality 
standards are met? How strict are these standards in terms of compliance? 
6. How are they transported to program areas? What is the average transport/delivery time and 
cost? 
7. Compared to the international supply what are the advantages of local procurement?  
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Part 6. Consent forms for Key informant interviews 
 
  Consent Form (Key informant Interview) 
   
You are invited to participate in a research study entitled: Role of informal institutions in 
the RUF supply chains in Ethiopia 
         
Researcher: Melat Adde, Graduate student, Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of 
Saskatchewan, Canada, +1 306-514-3601, mla398@mail.usask.ca  
 
Supervisor: Dr. Jill Hobbs, Agricultural and Resource Economics, +1 306 966-2445, 
jill.hobbs@usask.ca   
 
Purpose(s) and Objective(s) of the Research:  
 The purpose of the study is examine the supply chain of ready-to –use food products in 
Ethiopia and identify bottlenecks and potential areas of improvement along supply chain. 
 
Procedures: (What you will be asked to do when you participate in the study): 
 You will be asked to sit with the researcher to answer questions about the production, supply 
and delivery of ready-to-use food products.  
 The researcher may record the discussion/interview with voice recorder to better capture the 
issues discussed. You may request that the voice recorder be turned off at any time. 
 This discussion might take about an hour-an hour and half. 
 Please feel free to ask any questions regarding the procedures and goals of the study or your 
role. 
 
Funded by:  
 This study is supported by the Global Institute for Food Security (GIFS) 
 
Potential Risks:  
 There are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this research.  
  
Potential Benefits: 
 The outcome of the study can be used to improve our understanding of the opportunities 
and challenges facing the development of supply chains for ready-to-use therapeutic food 
products in Ethiopia  
 
Confidentiality:  
 All the information we will collect from you will be kept strictly confidential. Although the 
data from this research project will be published and presented at conferences, the data will 
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be reported in aggregate form, or in case a direct quotation has be used, personally identifying 
information will be removed so that it will not be possible to identify individuals.  
 You will also be given a chance to verify/modify the content of the discussion before it is 
reported. 
 
Storage of Data:  
 Consent forms and the questionnaire will be kept in a locked room with the student’s 
supervisor for about five years until findings are published and shared to relevant bodies. 
All electronic files will be stored in a password protected computer with the researcher.  
 When the data are no longer required, it will be destroyed safely. 
 
Right to Withdraw:   
 Your participation is voluntary and you can answer only those questions that you are 
comfortable with.  You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any 
time without explanation or penalty of any sort. 
 Should you wish to withdraw, you can do so at any time and you will be asked to provide 
permission for reporting of the sections of the study they may have completed until the 
point of withdrawal.  
 Your right to withdraw data from the study will apply until data have been pooled. After 
this point, it is possible that some form of research dissemination will have already 
occurred and it may not be possible to withdraw your data”. 
 
Follow up:  
 To obtain results from the study, please contact the researcher.  
 
Questions or Concerns:   
 Contact the researcher(s) using the information at the top of page 1; 
 This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board.  Any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant may be addressed to that committee through the Research Ethics Office 
ethics.office@usask.ca +1 (306) 966-2975 collect. 
 
Consent (Signed Consent)  
Your signature below indicates that you have read and understand the description provided; I 
have had an opportunity to ask questions and my/our questions have been answered. I consent to 
participate in the research project. A copy of this Consent Form has been given to me for my 
records. 
      
Name of Participant   Signature  Date 
 
______________________________      _______________________    
Researcher’s Signature   Date 
 
 
A copy of this consent will be left with you, and a copy will be taken by the researcher. 
